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To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom 
from Pretrial Immigration Detention 
DENISE GILMAN* 
Each year, the United States government detains more than 60,000 migrants who 
are eligible for release during immigration court proceedings that will determine 
their right to stay in the United States. Detention or release should be adjudicated 
through a custody determination process focused on the question of whether a mi-
grant poses a flight risk or danger to the community. Yet, because the process skips 
the critical inquiry into the need for detention before setting monetary bond require-
ments for release that are difficult to fulfill, freedom remains elusive.  
The custody determination process is a cornerstone in the U.S. immigration de-
tention edifice but has received scarce attention. Furthermore, the public debate on 
mass incarceration, which could meaningfully inform the discussion, generally ig-
nores the reality of expansive pretrial detention of migrants who could be released. 
This Article takes up the task of critiquing the role and functioning of the immigration 
custody determination process, in part by joining together the conversations taking 
place in the immigration and criminal pretrial realms.  
In this Article, I assert that the immigration custody determination process fails 
to preserve and protect the constitutional presumption of liberty applicable to all 
persons facing detention that is not imposed as punishment after a criminal convic-
tion. The process results in automatic detention without meaningful individualized 
consideration or review. Furthermore, it adopts elements from the criminal pretrial 
system that are ill suited to the immigration setting while failing to incorporate les-
sons learned in the criminal justice setting. Important considerations in the criminal 
justice context, such as the inadvisability of emphasizing monetary bond, do not 
make their way into the immigration custody determination process, with negative 
results for liberty. 
Given these realities, the Article both proposes normative changes to the immi-
gration custody determination process and calls for additional research in order to 
rationalize the process. These reforms would realign the system with the limited pur-
poses of immigration detention in order to protect liberty and avoid the significant 
human and societal costs associated with detaining individuals who may safely be 
released. 
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[C]ourts somehow give the impression that our system of bail preserves one of the 
most valuable rights of freedom. . . . Through most of the United States today the bail 
system is a cruel and illogical institution which perpetuates injustice in the name of 
the law. 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy1 
[The United States must ensure] that the bond system does not become another ob-
stacle that undocumented immigrants have to surmount in order to obtain the liberty 
to which they are, as a general rule, entitled. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights2 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, the United States detains more than 400,000 migrants in connection 
with immigration proceedings.3 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) holds 
these migrants in a civil detention regime, which means that they are held for 
nonpunitive administrative purposes rather than for punishment pursuant to a 
criminal conviction.4 A significant number of these migrants in detention are 
awaiting the conclusion of drawn-out deportation proceedings in the immigration 
courts, which will determine whether they will remain lawfully in the United States 
or will be deported.5 In other words, these are pretrial detainees in the immigration 
detention system.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to the Academy of 
Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County 1 (June 1, 1964). 
 2. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, REPORT ON 
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 82 [hereinafter IACHR 
REPORT ON DETENTION] (2010). 
 3. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 1 (2014) (reporting 
441,000 detained); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
DRAFT FISCAL YEAR 2014 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8 (2014) 
(draft report on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (reporting 425,728 detained in 2014, the 
last year that DHS provided detention statistics). These figures do not include and this Article 
does not address unaccompanied migrant children who undergo a different process where re-
lease is prioritized and detention takes place in licensed shelters. 6 U.S.C § 279(a)–(b) (2012); 
Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 7–12, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK (Px) (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 17, 1997).  
 4. Who We Are: Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov 
/about/overview [https://perma.cc/ST5E-P8FJ]; see also Immigration Enforcement: Detention 
Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/detention-management 
[https://perma.cc/L4MS-27WA]. 
 5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) (authorizing detention or release of migrants, “pending 
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States”); OFFICE OF 
PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICS, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, FY 2015: STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2–C4, K1, N1 (2016) [hereinafter EOIR 
STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015] (providing information regarding favorable decisions in depor-
tation proceedings allowing migrants to remain in this country). The proceedings are called 
“removal” proceedings but are commonly referred to as deportation proceedings, which is the 
terminology that I will use. 
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By conservative estimate, out of the more than 400,000 migrants detained annu-
ally, at least 60,000 are held in pretrial detention despite eligibility for release.6 These 
migrants spend time in detention, and not infrequently remain detained throughout 
the entirety of the lengthy court proceedings, largely due to a flawed system of cus-
tody determination.7 Thus, for substantial numbers of migrants who could be re-
leased through the custody determination process, often called bond proceedings in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. This estimate is derived from limited data available about those who seek review of 
pretrial detention in the immigration courts and is almost certainly underinclusive. Approxi-
mately 60,000 individuals sought custody redetermination hearings in immigration courts 
each year in 2014 and 2015. See EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015, supra note 5, at A1, A7–
A8 (explaining that “bond redetermination hearings” are custody redetermination hearings and 
setting out that over 60,000 bond redetermination requests were made in 2014 and 2015). 
These 60,000 hearings serve as a proxy for determining how many individuals are release-
eligible but are detained pretrial for some period, because these hearings are only available to 
individuals who are held in custody in connection with deportation proceedings prior to a final 
order of deportation and who are not subject to mandatory detention. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) 
(2016). However, the hearings data serves as an imperfect proxy that errs toward undercount-
ing. A small percentage of those who pursue custody redetermination hearings in immigration 
court are actually not eligible for those hearings and instead are subject to mandatory detention 
and so not eligible for release. See Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially Unlikely”: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, 
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 70–71 (2011) (finding fewer than 200 cases on Westlaw that 
involved hearings in mandatory detention cases that were appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals over a four-year period). A much larger number of individuals will have 
been detained but then released by DHS, often upon payment of bond, before a custody 
redetermination hearing in immigration court could be held. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven 
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
69–71 (2015) (noting that only 37% of migrants released from detention during immigration 
court deportation proceedings between 2007 and 2012 were released pursuant to an 
immigration court custody redetermination hearing); infra Part I.A. These individuals released 
by DHS will not have an immigration court custody redetermination hearing and so will not 
be included in the immigration court’s figures but were in pretrial immigration detention for 
some period. In addition, some migrants who are not subject to mandatory detention pending 
immigration court deportation proceedings are nonetheless not eligible for an immigration 
court custody redetermination hearing and will also not appear in the immigration court 
figures. See infra Part I.B. The 60,000 estimate for release-eligible detainees pending 
immigration court deportation proceedings also is lower than but corresponds reasonably well 
with the number of such detainees calculated several years ago with more data available. See 
Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law To Realign 
Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 327 (2013) 
(estimating 75,000 release-eligible individuals detained pretrial); see also HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 11–12 
(2016) (in fiscal year 2014, 44,270 asylum seekers alone were held in immigration detention; 
this figure does not include individuals in pretrial detention during pending deportation 
proceedings who are not seeking asylum). It is notoriously difficult to obtain from DHS the 
data necessary to calculate the exact number of detainees in any category. See, e.g., AMNESTY 
INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 6–7 (2009).  
 7. See N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY STEERING COMM., ACCESSING JUSTICE 
II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
13 (2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf [https:// 
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immigration parlance, the promise of freedom remains elusive. This Article will ex-
plore that reality. 
The custody determination process is a cornerstone in the U.S. immigration 
detention edifice.8 Yet, the role of the custody determination system in the 
contemporary detention regime has received scarce attention.9 Scholars and 
advocates have occasionally criticized the rapid expansion of immigration detention 
generally10 and have intensely scrutinized mandatory detention, which makes certain 
categories of individuals ineligible for pretrial release, usually based on criminal 
history.11 In contrast, they have neglected the growth of pretrial detention for release-
eligible individuals. Until very recently, the limited research on the custody 
determination process for release-eligible immigrants dated to more than twenty 
                                                                                                                 
 
perma.cc/GM64-5XB2] [hereinafter NYIRS REPORT] (91% of those initially detained in New 
York remained detained); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 6, at 65 (finding an average length of 
detention of 314 days for individuals who remain detained and obtain counsel to assist in 
seeking relief from deportation); Migration and Refugee Services/U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops & Center for Migration Studies, Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan To Transform the 
US Immigrant Detention System, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 159, 178 (2015) (not-
ing that “long-term detention persists for large numbers of persons with pending removal pro-
ceedings”) [hereinafter Unlocking Human Dignity]; Decisions on ICE Detainees: State-by-
State Details, TRAC IMMIGRATION (May 22, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports 
/320/ [https://perma.cc/HR4R-BQUD] (demonstrating that the majority of immigration de-
tainees remain in custody throughout immigration court deportation proceedings; finding that, 
in 2012, only 25% of immigration detainees were released prior to a final immigration court 
decision in deportation proceedings and the remainder were released through deportation in 
execution of a final immigration court order or through a final favorable immigration court 
decision granting the right to remain in the United States). 
 8. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: 
BOND GUIDE, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Bond_Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M2E-3E9J] (guide for immigration judges regarding the custody re-
determination process) [hereinafter IJ BOND BENCHBOOK]; Janet A. Gilboy, Administrative 
Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 515, 520 (1988) (bond 
determinations are “an important feature of immigration law enforcement”).  
 9. But see Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional 
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013) (describing problems with the custody de-
termination process as well as mandatory detention); Gilman, supra note 6, at 326–33 (using 
human rights to offer an initial analysis of detention for release-eligible migrants). 
 10. See, e.g., David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration 
Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1006 (2002); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). 
 11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (mandatory detention statute); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 
F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015) (challenge to prolonged mandatory detention without bond hearing); 
Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); Diop v. 
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F. 
Supp. 2d 258 (D. Mass. 2013) (litigation urging limits on the category of persons subject to 
mandatory detention); Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363 (2014); Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The 
State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010); Stephen 
H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 531 (1999). 
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years ago when the immigration detention system was vastly smaller.12 A few 
important empirical research projects have recently assessed determinants of certain 
subsets of pretrial immigration detention decisions.13 However, the role and 
functioning of the custody determination process within the modern immigration 
detention system simply has not been studied.  
In this Article, I critically analyze the process of custody determination and call 
for additional research for a number of reasons. First, advocates, policymakers, and 
scholars must better understand the process, which determines the detention fate of 
an entire segment of the immigrant population taken into DHS custody. Otherwise, 
it is impossible to grasp the full picture of the immigration detention system and its 
impact.  
Second, critiques of the role of pretrial detention in mass incarceration in the 
criminal justice setting need to attend to the large numbers of migrants who are held 
pending immigration court deportation proceedings. Reforms that seek to limit pre-
trial criminal detention, to restore its exceptional and nonpunitive role,14 could both 
inform and take caution from what is happening in the immigration context. To fully 
account for the impacts of pretrial detention on incarceration in the United States, 
the immigration system must receive attention. In fact, the number of release-eligible 
individuals in pretrial immigration detention is very similar to the number of pretrial 
detainees in the federal criminal justice system.15  
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ED198197, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: 
CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 104–07 (1980) (citing INS, A COMPARISON OF THE 
BOND-SETTING PRACTICES OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE WITH THAT OF 
THE CRIMINAL COURTS 20–31 (1978) (reporting results of that study); EDWIN HARWOOD, IN 
LIBERTY’S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 120–21 (1986) 
Gilboy, supra note 8, at 520 & n.32 (empirical study of bond decisions in Chicago in the early 
1980s which cites a few earlier studies); Robert M. Sanders, Immigration Bond: An Analysis 
of the Determinants of Official Decisions, 20 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 139 (1993). 
 13. Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014) (studying the risk classification tool aspect of initial custody determi-
nations made at the DHS level); Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 
50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2016) (studying custody determinations made at the immigration 
court level in a specific subset of cases that were initially treated as falling within the manda-
tory detention scheme). 
 14. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A 
FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM iii–iv, 1–3, 35, 99–116 (2014) (setting out 
case law and standards establishing that criminal pretrial detention must be the exception and 
liberty the norm, given the civil nonpunitive nature of detention absent a conviction, and urg-
ing reform of pretrial systems to provide for presumptive pretrial release); Nick Pinto, The 
Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the 
-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/D2ZK-67XE] (highlighting extensive criminal pretrial deten-
tion as part of the mass incarceration problem and describing efforts at reform of the pretrial 
detention system); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (clarifying that 
pretrial criminal detention must be limited and nonpunitive). 
 15. See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 13 (2015) [hereinafter MOTIVANS, 2012 
STATISTICAL TABLES] (approximately 70,000 defendants detained pretrial after initial hearing 
or detention hearing in 2012); MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T. OF 
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In addition, the study of the immigration custody determination process reveals 
that pretrial immigration detention is intertwined with pretrial detention in the crimi-
nal justice system. By analyzing the immigration custody determination process and 
its relationship to pretrial detention in the criminal justice context, an important con-
nection is made between the conversations taking place in the immigration and crimi-
nal pretrial realms. This connection allows for a better assessment of the potential 
for erosion of the limits on nonpunitive detention in the immigration setting and more 
generally. 
Unfortunately, a focused analysis on the immigration custody determination pro-
cess provides much cause for concern. Bringing to bear the literature on immigration 
detention on one hand and nonimmigration criminal detention on the other, I contend 
that, as currently designed and implemented, the custody determination process fails 
to protect the constitutional right to liberty of immigrants. The process leads to au-
tomatic detention without meaningful individualized consideration or review. Fur-
thermore, the process adopts elements from the criminal pretrial system that are ill 
suited to the immigration setting, even while failing to incorporate lessons learned in 
the criminal justice context. My argument proceeds as follows. 
I will first provide a description of the custody determination process for 
release-eligible migrants in Part I of this Article. I will then proceed to describe a 
number of serious problems with the current system in Part II. Part II first establishes 
that the legal contours of the immigration custody determination process, along with 
implementation practices, make the process an ineffectual mechanism for ensuring 
that civil immigration detention adheres to its limited and nonpunitive purposes. In-
stead, the custody determination process imposes automatic detention as a starting 
point, without individualized determinations of necessity and without a guarantee of 
prompt release where detention is not justified by a specific flight risk or danger. Part 
II then turns to the impediments on obtaining release after a detention decision is 
made, which stem from the immigration system’s adoption of elements from the 
criminal pretrial system while ignoring lessons learned in the criminal justice setting. 
An undue emphasis on monetary bond as a condition for release is identified as a 
central issue. Unjustified reliance on ill-fitting pretrial risk factors from the criminal 
justice system also leads to flawed custody decisions for migrants and the likelihood 
of ongoing detention.  
Given the seriousness of these issues and the need to realign the system with the 
permissible purposes of immigration detention, in Part III, I offer some initial pro-
posals for reconfiguring the custody determination process. The proposals would 
provide greater protections for the liberty interests of migrants while also avoiding 
significant costs to the system and society caused by detaining individuals who may 
safely be released. I will also suggest additional study to ensure that the system en-
sures that custody decisions are based on appropriate considerations and are closely 
tied to the legitimate goals of addressing flight risk or danger to the community. 
                                                                                                                 
 
JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2011–2012 at 2 (2015) [hereinafter MOTIVANS, 2011–
2012 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS] (61,255 pretrial detainees in federal confinement in 2012). 
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I. THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION PROCESS 
The process that determines custody for release-eligible migrants in immigration 
court deportation proceedings is opaque and has not been set out comprehensively 
in the literature.16 While multiple exceptions and details complicate matters consid-
erably, at the most basic level, the process generally consists of two parts: (1) a DHS 
decision to detain or release made after apprehension, and (2) a subsequent immi-
gration court custody redetermination hearing that takes place alongside the im-
migration court deportation proceedings. Importantly, pretrial custody determina-
tions and deportation proceedings are connected but separate processes. Immigration 
court deportation proceedings do not require detention. A migrant may never be 
apprehended and detained at all but still be placed in immigration court deportation 
proceedings or may be detained but then released as the proceedings move forward. 
Conversely, pretrial detention for deportation proceedings does not mean that a 
migrant will necessarily be deported in the end. Some migrants may be detained pre-
trial during part or all of the immigration court deportation proceedings and then win 
the right to remain in the United States at the conclusion, achieving release as a result 
of that final decision. A more developed description of the custody determination 
process follows in order to unriddle the system’s functioning and provide necessary 
background for the subsequent analysis. A flowchart of the process is provided as 
well on page 166. 
 This description and the remainder of the Article address the process for all mi-
grants who are detained pending ongoing immigration court deportation proceedings 
and who face no statutory impediment to release. As a result, I do not include those 
with final deportation orders.17 I also do not include individuals in pending 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Even the terminology used to describe the custody determination process is often per-
plexing. References to “bond hearings” or “bond proceedings” are not found in the statute or 
regulations, but those terms are used to describe the custody determination process. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a) (2012) (section titled “Arrest, detention and release”); 8 CFR § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) 
(section titled “Apprehension, custody and detention”); EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015, 
supra note 5, at A1 (describing “bond redetermination hearings” and “bonds”); EXEC. OFFICE 
OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 8, at 2 (indiscriminately referencing “bond hearings,” 
“custody hearings,” and “bond redetermination hearings”). The term “bond” is sometimes 
used to describe a particular monetary bond that has been set as a condition on release but is 
also used more generally to describe the detention/release decision or process. Thus, a decision 
to detain is often described as a “no bond” decision (which is confusingly the opposite of a 
decision to release without a bond requirement). In addition, those who are not eligible for a 
custody redetermination hearing in immigration court are often described as not being “bond-
eligible” when the limitation on their rights is not about bond but about immigration court 
review. The use of the term “bail” is also confusing. Sometimes flight risk is described as “bail 
risk,” which suggests that bail is equivalent to release. E.g., Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 667 
(B.I.A. 1976), 1976 WL 32348, at *1. In other instances, the term “bail” is used interchange-
ably with monetary bond imposed as a condition of release. E.g., San Martin, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. 167, 168 (1974), 1974 WL 30025, at *2. Criminal justice commentators have similarly 
struggled with the terminology surrounding pretrial detention and release determinations and 
conditions on release. See SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 99–105.  
 17. Some detained migrants with a deportation order are removed summarily from the 
United States under expedited procedures and do not spend extensive periods in detention, 
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deportation proceedings who are subject to the mandatory detention statute, which 
covers migrants who have been convicted of any of a wide range of crimes and mi-
grants certified as presenting terrorism concerns.18  
A. Initial DHS Custody Determinations 
For migrants who are apprehended and placed into immigration court deportation 
proceedings, DHS makes an initial decision to detain or to release if the migrant is 
not subject to mandatory detention.19 The initial decision regarding detention usually 
takes place shortly after apprehension.20 However, there are some cases where an 
individual is initially not eligible for release, generally because of immediate impo-
sition of a deportation order in expedited proceedings,21 but then becomes release-
eligible after passing a screening interview that vacates the initial deportation order 
and places the individual into pending deportation proceedings.22 In those cases,  
DHS makes a custody decision after the individual becomes eligible for release. 
DHS has full authority, in its decision, to release an apprehended individual who 
is not subject to mandatory detention. Most migrants not in mandatory detention fall 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides in permissive terms that a migrant “may 
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed 
from the United States.”23 The statute goes on to provide that, after arrest, immi-
gration authorities “(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
while others are detained for relatively short periods pending physical removal after a final 
deportation decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012) (expedited removal for cer-
tain recent arrivals without valid immigration documents); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012) (re-
instatement of removal and post-removal detention for those with final orders of deportation); 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701–02 (2001) (requiring presumptive release if detention 
continues beyond six months after final deportation order); SIMANSKI, supra note 3, at 5 (DHS 
deported over 350,000 individuals through abbreviated expedited removal and reinstatement 
of removal proceedings). 
 18. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (requiring detention of migrants convicted of certain crimi-
nal offenses); 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2012) (requiring detention of designated suspected terrorists); 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (finding mandatory detention constitutional). 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). Various DHS entities may conduct the 
initial apprehension, but the DHS subagency known as Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) assumes custody if an individual is ordered detained. Immigration 
Enforcement: Detention Management, supra note 4; Who We Are: Overview, supra note 4. 
 20. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (arrest must be followed in forty-eight hours by deci-
sion whether to detain). 
 21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (requiring detention of individuals in expedited 
removal).  
 22. X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (B.I.A. 2005), 2005 WL 1104422, at *1 (holding that 
custody redetermination hearings are available to individuals who have left expedited removal 
and are now in full deportation proceedings seeking asylum). It may be argued that those in 
expedited removal need not be detained before the screening interview but rather only if they 
do not pass the interview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Regardless, detention is not 
required after a favorable screening. X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 731. 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 
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Figure 1. Immigration Custody Determination Process 
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the alien . . . .”24 DHS may release a migrant on recognizance, sometimes known as 
conditional parole, or under other arrangements, such as placement in a formal alter-
natives to detention program.25  
However, DHS only rarely releases a migrant after apprehension in its first deci-
sion on custody.26 Immigration officials almost always detain arrested individuals 
for at least some time period as they initiate deportation proceedings in the immigra-
tion courts.27  
When it makes an initial custody determination not to release immediately, DHS 
may either: (1) order detention directly, without the availability of release on bond; 
or (2) set a monetary bond, which if paid will result in release.28 Where bond is set, 
a minimum bond amount of $1500 is required by law,29 but bond is often set much 
higher with bond amounts nationwide averaging at approximately $6000.30 The bond 
must be paid in full before the migrant will be released.31 A decision to require a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.; Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“the phrase ‘release on recognizance’ [is used] as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under 
§ 1226(a).”).  
 26. See, e.g., Eliott C. McLaughlin & Catherine E. Shoichet, Jose Antonio Vargas, 
Symbol of Immigration Debate, Freed After Detention, CNN (July 15, 2014), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/justice/texas-jose-vargas-detained/ [https://perma.cc/RUF3-WW3U] 
(high-profile journalist released shortly after apprehension as deportation proceedings 
initiated). 
 27. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 50 (calculating 91% detention rate for DHS 
custody determination); Decisions on ICE Detainees: State-by-State Details, supra note 7 (4% 
of detainees released on their own recognizance from initial place of detention). 
 28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016). 
 29. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (setting minimum bond of $1500).  
 30. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 14, 17 (calculating that nationwide average bond 
amount is almost $6000 and providing examples of bonds set at $25,000 to $50,000); Eagly 
& Shafer, supra note 6, at 69 n.220 (noting that authors observed bond amounts ranging from 
$1500 to $50,000 and citing other studies finding average bond amounts of anywhere between 
$5000 and $15,000 in different contexts); Letter from Judy Rabinovitz, Deputy Dir. and Dir. 
of Detention and Fed. Enf’t Programs, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, to Leon Fresco, 
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Div.—Office of Immigration Litig. (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/rilr_letter_re_high_bonds_for_class 
_members_5_11_15-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVY2-CS9K] [hereinafter ACLU Letter 
Regarding High Bonds] (describing a regular ICE practice of setting $7500 to $20,000 bonds 
for women detained with their children); Regina Garcia Cano, Huge Rise Seen in ICE Cases 
Released on Bail, HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston 
-texas/article/Huge-rise-seen-in-ICE-cases-released-on-bail-3432655.php [https://perma.cc 
/D37C-8T3N] (calculating an average bond amount of over $5000 in 2011). 
 31. The government does not accept unsecured or deposit bonds, which are sometimes 
available in the criminal pretrial context and which allow release upon payment of a percent-
age of the bond or without any payment at the outset, pursuant to a contractual promise to pay 
the full bond amount only in the case of breach. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (requiring security); 
JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY 
FOR BAIL 7, 9 (2012) (defining unsecured and deposit bonds). Commercial surety bonds, 
which consist of a contractual promise by a commercial security entity to pay the bond in case 
of breach, are available upon payment of a fee to the commercial surety company. See 8 C.F.R. 
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bond necessarily involves continued detention for some period of time, at least until bond 
payment is gathered and presented or the bond decision is reviewed and modified or 
vacated.  
Under current interpretation of the law, some migrants do not undergo the DHS 
custody determination process as just described, even though they are held pending 
ongoing deportation proceedings and do not fall within the mandatory detention 
scheme. This limitation applies most frequently to certain migrants who are initially 
subject to expedited deportation but then pass a screening interview to establish a 
refugee claim, which places them into full immigration court deportation proceed-
ings to seek refugee status. Specifically, the limitation applies to asylum seekers ap-
prehended right at the border and treated as “arriving aliens”32 and to migrants with 
prior deportation orders who seek asylum-related refugee protection.33 According to 
current interpretation, these individuals do not qualify for a DHS custody determi-
nation as such but rather qualify only for “parole” or “supervised release” from de-
tention at DHS discretion.34 However, DHS does regularly reach detention determi-
nations in these cases by making a decision whether or not to grant parole or other 
release, at least where a request for release is presented.35  
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 103.6 (2016). However, these and other bondsmen mechanisms are rarely used in the immi-
gration detention context. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS BOND MANAGEMENT 
HANDBOOK 5 (2014) (about 90% of immigration bonds are paid in full at the outset). 
 32. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2016); X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005), 
2005 WL 1104422; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE 
NO. 11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF 
PERSECUTION OR TORTURE 2 (2009) [hereinafter PAROLE DIRECTIVE]. The policy for arriving 
aliens might also apply to other individuals who are not asylum seekers. However, in practice, 
most arriving aliens who are not asylum seekers are subject to mandatory detention on other 
grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012) (detention during expedited removal); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) (2012) (mandatory detention on criminal grounds). 
 33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)–(3) (2012). The law is not 
altogether clear regarding the status of individuals with prior deportation orders who seek 
refugee protection in deportation proceedings after having passed a screening interview. How-
ever, the best interpretation is that these individuals are not subject to a final deportation order, 
and detention on that basis, because they have pending proceedings that may result in a deci-
sion allowing them to remain in the United States. See Guerra v. Shanahan, No. 15-504-CV, 
2016 WL 4056035, at *4 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016); Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III), 
804 F.3d 1060, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. 
Ct. 2489 (2016). 
 34. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5) (West 2005 & Supp. 2016); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)–(3) 
(2012); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2016); Inspection and Expedited Removal 
of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum 
Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10320 (Mar. 6, 1997) (codified in scattered parts of 8 C.F.R.).  
 35. Commentators often describe these individuals as not bond-eligible or even as subject 
to mandatory detention. However, that phrasing does not accurately describe the limitation. 
They can be detained or released, so they are not subject to mandatory detention. E.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225 (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“mandatory detention” provision applying only after a failed screen-
ing interview); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (providing mandatory detention only for individuals 
found deportable on serious criminal or security grounds); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(c)–(d) (allowing 
and setting conditions for parole when mandatory detention does not apply); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 
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B. Custody Redetermination by DHS and the Immigration Court 
DHS may always redetermine custody status after the initial DHS custody deter-
mination.36 In other words, DHS may change a bond amount imposed or order re-
lease on recognizance after initially setting a bond. It also may reconsider a denial of 
parole or order of supervision or modify the terms of a parole or supervision order.37 
In most cases, the initial DHS custody determination is also subject to a custody 
redetermination hearing before an immigration court.38 The immigration courts are 
housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the 
Department of Justice.39 The immigration judges are thus separate from DHS but are 
administrative judges.40  
A detainee must make an “application” to the immigration judge to obtain this 
review of the custody determination made by DHS.41 The review is not automatic. It 
usually takes weeks for an immigration court custody redetermination hearing to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
(allowing for release on order of supervision); E-mail from Marlen Piñeiro, Assistant Dir. For 
Repatriation, & Philip Miller, Assistant Dir. For Field Operations, to Assistant Dirs., Deputy 
Assistant Dirs., Field Office Dirs., & Deputy Field Office Dirs. (July 31, 2014, 2:57 PM) 
(e-mail obtained through FOIA Response to Andrew Free on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal) (providing guidance from DHS headquarters to all field offices that detention is not 
mandatory for individuals with reinstated deportation orders who seek refugee protection); 
E-mail from Philip T. Miller, Assistant Dir. For Field Operations, to Field Office Dirs. & 
Deputy Field Office Dirs. (June 6, 2014, 10:42 AM) (e-mail obtained through FOIA Response 
to Andrew Free on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (providing guidance from DHS head-
quarters to all field offices that “mandatory detention” applies in expedited removal only 
before a favorable credible fear screening and also noting that “arriving aliens” may be re-
leased on parole). And a monetary bond may be assessed if DHS decides to release on parole 
or under supervision, so the possibility of release upon condition of bond payment exists as 
well. See PAROLE DIRECTIVE, supra note 32, at 7; 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
supra note 6, at 4 (84% of attorneys responding to a questionnaire indicate that DHS regularly 
assesses a monetary bond in connection with a grant of parole). These individuals just do not 
receive a DHS custody determination under 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8), although it is not clear that 
the statute or regulations preclude application of the same initial DHS custody determination 
process applied to other detained migrants. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing for authority to 
detain or release for all individuals in deportation proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) 
(providing for initial custody determination for any individual pending deportation proceed-
ings except those subject to mandatory detention on criminal grounds under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)). As will be discussed below, current interpretation does preclude the possibility for 
immigration court custody redetermination hearings in these cases. See X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
731 (B.I.A. 2005), 2005 WL 1104422; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2016); E-mail from 
Marlen Piñeiro, supra. 
 36. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)–(9); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d). 
 37. PAROLE DIRECTIVE, supra note 32, at 4. 
 38. E.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19; 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2016). 
 39. About the Office, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm [https://perma.cc/2UKV-Y5Z5]. 
 40. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (2016). 
 41. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d); see P-C-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 432 (B.I.A. 1991), 1991 WL 353532; 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19. 
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scheduled after the initial DHS custody determination.42 As will be described further 
below, the review is also limited.43 In addition, immigration judge review is provided 
only on one occasion as of right. Any subsequent requests for review by the immi-
gration judge “shall be considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circum-
stances have changed materially since the prior . . . redetermination.”44  
Under current law and interpretation, “arriving aliens” and individuals with prior 
deportation orders are not entitled to immigration judge review of the detention 
decision made by DHS even after they pass the relevant screening interviews and are 
seeking refugee status in full immigration court deportation proceedings.45 Thus, a 
DHS decision to detain or to impose conditions on release is not reviewable by any 
outside adjudicator. The Ninth Circuit has held that some individuals held under this 
regime for six months or longer must receive the opportunity to obtain immigration 
court review of custody.46 However, the Ninth Circuit’s rule is the exception and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. See, e.g., Declaration of Barbara Hines at 7, R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 164 (D.D.C. 
2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00011-JEB) (describing periods of weeks or months between DHS and 
immigration court custody determinations in family detention cases). There is often a delay in 
the request being made, since review is not automatic and there is no specific time limit by 
which the immigration court must schedule the hearing once requested. See Rodriguez III, 804 
F.3d 1060, 1085 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that migrants may not request an immigration court 
custody redetermination hearing because they may not be aware of their right to such a hearing 
and may be “poorly equipped to request one”), cert. granted sub nom Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.3(d) (2016), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments 
/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-08-2016_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/43VS-NQ2F] (not-
ing that the immigration court will schedule a requested hearing for the “earliest possible 
date”); cf. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320–21 (2009) (finding that prompt 
presentment before a judicial offer is required in the criminal context to ensure a prompt 
decision on detention or release); Cal. Penal Code § 825 (West 2008) (requiring arraignment, 
including decision on detention or release, within 48 hours of arrest except in special 
circumstances). 
 43. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 44. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 
 45. A-W-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 45, 47–48 (B.I.A. 2009), 2009 WL 8628885, at *2–3 (holding 
that the immigration courts do not conduct custody redetermination hearings for individuals 
who do not receive a Notice to Appear as a charging document, which includes individuals 
with a prior deportation order who are seeking refugee protection); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.1(c)(11) (precluding immigration court custody redetermination hearings for 
individuals identified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B)); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) 
(making immigration court custody redetermination hearings unavailable for “arriving” 
aliens); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (providing for immigration court custody redetermination 
hearings only for individuals held in detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)); E-mail from Marlen 
Piñeiro, supra note 35 (setting out interpretation that individuals with prior deportation orders 
who seek refugee protection are held under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) and noting that generally 
immigration court custody redetermination hearings are unavailable for this group); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1241.14(a) (providing for immigration court custody hearings for migrants held under 8 
U.S.C. § 1231 in very limited circumstances that do not apply to individuals seeking refugee 
protection). 
 46. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1074 (holding that immigration judges must provide cus-
tody redetermination hearings after six-month detention periods for “arriving” aliens and other 
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applies only after detention has become prolonged. It has not led to changes in the 
rules or practice in other parts of the country.  
For migrants who are eligible to seek an immigration court custody re-
determination hearing, an appeal of the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) is available.47 The BIA is also within the Department of 
Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review and is the appellate administrative 
body for adjudication of immigration cases.48 
Review of the final agency decision regarding custody is generally not available 
in the federal courts.49 The immigration statute specifically states that such detention 
decisions made by immigration officials are not “subject to review.”50 A detained 
migrant’s only recourse to the federal courts is through a habeas petition.51 Such a 
petition must challenge the legality of the custody determination.52 It does not offer 
an opportunity for review of the merits of an individual decision to detain or release 
or the imposition of conditions on release.53 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION PROCESS 
The custody determination process dictates detention or freedom for release-
eligible migrants in pending deportation proceedings. As such, the process must be 
analyzed in light of the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings that permit but 
limit immigration detention.  
Liberty places a central role in constitutional theory, with freedom from physical 
restraint at the core of the protections offered.54 Liberty is the norm, and deprivation 
of freedom is the limited exception.55 Imprisonment is permitted only as criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 
class members who were not previously granted such hearings); Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 1127, 
1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that class members were likely to succeed on the merits of their 
claim that a custody redetermination hearing is required after six months for certain individu-
als who were not previously granted such hearings); see also Guerra v. Shanahan, No. 15-504-
CV, 2016 WL 4056035, at *4 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016) (affirming grant of habeas providing for 
custody redetermination hearing in immigration court for individual with prior deportation 
order). 
 47. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3). 
 48. Board of Immigration Appeals, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm [https://perma.cc/64GN-5K84]. 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 
 52. See id.; Kambo v. Poppell, No. SA-07-CV-800-XR, 2007 WL 3051601, at *7 (W.D. 
Tex. Oct. 18, 2007) (detained aliens may bring habeas corpus challenges to the constitution-
ality of the statutory detention framework). 
 53. See Kambo, 2007 WL 3051601, at *7 (habeas does not allow for review of discre-
tionary judgments regarding release or bond, including the manner in which judgments are 
made). 
 54. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from 
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the 
liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
 55. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, 
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). 
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punishment after a conviction or as civil administrative detention justified on other 
limited grounds.56 Because civil detention does not involve a conviction, the 
Constitution dictates that it must be carefully cabined. Civil detention may only be 
used where necessary to meet narrow, nonpunitive governmental goals, generally 
limited to prevention of danger to the community or flight from judicial processes.57  
It is well accepted that immigration detention is only proper if it is justifiable civil 
detention, since it is not based on a criminal conviction.58 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has upheld the constitutionality of immigration detention but has also carefully lim-
ited its reach.59 As with other forms of administrative detention, liberty is the norm 
and immigration detention is generally only permissible as a means of preventing 
flight or protecting against danger to the community.60 An individualized determina-
tion of the need to detain for these purposes is required.61 While the Court has held 
that Congress may establish mandatory detention for limited periods of time for cer-
tain named categories of migrants found to present a particular risk, such automatic 
and non-individualized detention otherwise contravenes constitutional requirements.62  
Similarly, in line with U.S. constitutional standards, international human rights 
law preventing arbitrary detention requires that the government detain migrants only 
as a last resort.63 Detention must be shown to be necessary in an individual case in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57, 363–64 (1997) (finding civil 
commitment constitutionally permissible in “narrow circumstances” if no “punitive” objective 
or intent shown); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (state power in civil commit-
ment cases is constitutional if not exercised in a “punitive sense”).  
 58. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92 (holding that immigration detention is civil detention 
that requires strong justification, usually in the form of flight risk or danger to the community); 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 313 (1993) (requiring individualized justification for immigra-
tion detention); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 14–11421, 2016 WL 3344236, at *10 (11th Cir. 
June 15, 2016) (noting that even mandatory immigration detention is “civil detention” and 
involves a “profound liberty interest”); R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 164, 187 No. 15-11 
(D.D.C. 2015) (immigration detention is “undisputedly civil” and so must be justified on non-
punitive grounds); DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 n.2 (2009) 
(emphasizing that ICE detention is civil, not criminal). 
 59. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (liberty may be restricted only where “a special justifica-
tion” exists to outweigh an individual’s liberty interest). 
 60. Id. at 690–92; Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *1 
(stating that immigration detention determinations are made in reference to flight risk and 
danger to the community); R.I.L-R, 80 F.3d at 188–90; (finding that flight risk and danger are 
the main permissible justifications for immigration detention and that deterrence of further 
migration is likely not a permissible justification because it sounds in criminal law); Cole, 
supra note 10, at 1006–10 (highlighting these two principle justifications for civil detention 
derived from U.S. case law—flight risk or danger to the community). 
 61. Demore, 538 U.S. 510, 531–32 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 62. See id. at 514 n.3, 518, 526–27 (permitting only limited mandatory pretrial detention); 
id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (establishing that “individualized determination as to . . . 
risk of flight and dangerousness” would be necessary for longer detention periods); Reno, 
507 U.S. at 313 (requiring some level of particularized determination in custody decisions). 
 63. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 9(1), opened 
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Everyone 
2016] TO LOOSE THE BONDS  173 
 
order to meet a valid and nonpunitive governmental goal, usually relating to flight 
risk or danger.64  
As currently configured and implemented, the immigration pretrial custody de-
termination process fails to fulfill a safeguarding role to ensure that liberty is pro-
tected and detention is limited to those circumstances when it is necessary in indi-
vidual cases. The system thus fails to comport with constitutional and human rights 
limitations on deprivation of liberty.  
As will be discussed further in the remainder of this Part, there are two central 
problems. The first problem is that the custody determination process does not 
                                                                                                                 
 
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention.”); Organization of American States (OAS), American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man art. I, Apr. 30. 1948, KAV 7225 (“Every human being has the right to . . . 
liberty . . . .”); id. art. XXV (entitling section “Right of protection from arbitrary arrest”); 
IACHR Report on Detention, supra note 2, at ¶ 38 (requiring “exceptionality of pre-trial de-
tention”); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, DETENTION GUIDELINES: 
GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF 
ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, Guideline 4.1 (2012) [hereinafter 
UNHCR Detention Guidelines], http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/505b10ee9 
/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/DFC8-7NWL] (“Detention is an excep-
tional measure”); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, DETENTION OF REFUGEES 
AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS: CONCLUSION NO. 44 (XXXVII) (Oct. 13, 1986) (detention of asylum 
seekers should “normally be avoided”); Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, 
Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶ 9.2 (Apr. 3, 1997) 
(“[R]emand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the 
circumstances of the case . . . .”). The United States is bound by these international human 
rights norms. The United States has ratified the ICCPR, which makes that instrument binding 
if not self-executing. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 203 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that, “[w]hether a treaty is self-executing or not, it is 
legally binding on the United States”). The United States has also ratified the United Nations 
Refugee Convention, which is the instrument interpreted by UNHCR in its Detention 
Guidelines and other guidance on detention of asylum seekers. See United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force for the 
United States in 1968 through accession to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267). Through its membership in the OAS and ratification of the 
legally binding OAS Charter, the United States accepted obligations to protect the human 
rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which is inter-
preted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. See Charter of the Organization of American States , art. 3(1), Apr. 30, 1948, 
2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. (as amended through 1993) (ratified by the United States in 
1951); Workman v. United States, Case 12.261, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 33/06, 
¶ 70 (2006), http://cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/USA.12261eng.htm [https://perma.cc/9QW6 
-8VVD]. 
 64. See Human Rights Comm., A, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, at ¶ 9.4 (holding 
that the grounds for immigration detention must be “particular to . . . individual[s]”); UNHCR 
DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 18–19, 21–30, 47(v) (providing that decisions to 
detain must be based on a “detailed and individualised assessment” and must be justified for 
public order or security reasons, usually where there is a risk that the asylum seeker will ab-
scond or an objective security threat); IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 39, 
102 (accepting the need to ensure that an individual reports for immigration court proceedings 
and protection of public safety as justifications for detention). 
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function to make an individualized assessment of the need to detain a particular 
migrant before depriving an individual of liberty. Much less does it guarantee review 
to ensure that the decision regarding detention is justified. Instead, the process 
defaults to detention for at least some period and focuses on setting monetary bond 
amounts as a condition of eventual release. Detention, even if relatively brief, runs 
afoul of liberty principles if not anchored in an individualized determination of 
need.65 Once detention is begun on a default basis, however, it also readily becomes 
prolonged and may last throughout the immigration court deportation proceedings.  
Eventual release is limited, largely because bonds present a second problem. The 
potential for eventual release after payment of a bond does not adequately protect 
against unjustified deprivation of liberty given the starting place that presumes de-
tention. The bond system is borrowed from the criminal justice system, yet the crimi-
nal justice system has moved away from the use of monetary bonds because of the 
impediment to liberty that they create even where detention is not necessary to 
prevent flight or danger. Criteria borrowed from the criminal justice system 
nominally guide the bond decision, but these criteria were not intended for the 
purpose of determining bond amounts and have not been tested for relevance in the 
immigration system. Bond amounts are set arbitrarily. The bondsetting process thus 
results in continued detention of many migrants who do not present a flight risk or 
danger and should be at liberty. 
A. Lack of Individualized Determination of the Need To Detain 
as a Safeguard for Liberty 
Scholars and advocates alike have condoned the custody determination process 
in juxtaposition to the much-maligned mandatory detention framework. Mandatory 
detention has been consistently criticized for imposing detention lacking in individu-
alized consideration and review, such that detention is not justified and may become 
unnecessarily prolonged.66 Commentators hold out the custody determination pro-
cess, in contrast, as the mechanism that allows for individualized determinations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding detention 
constitutional where there is a congressional determination that special justification exists for 
detention of certain categories of migrants but limiting such justification to a “reasonable” 
period and otherwise affirming the requirement of individualized determination of the neces-
sity of detention without regard to length); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (indefinite immigration 
detention only permissible where “special justification” exists; emphasizing problematic na-
ture of “indefinite” detention of individuals subject to final deportation order only because 
special justification weakens over time in such cases as physical deportation becomes increas-
ingly unlikely). As discussed further below, even limited periods of detention have serious 
negative consequences. See infra notes 178, 260–64 and accompanying text.  
 66. See, e.g., Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 1127, 1136–44 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that manda-
tory detention is unlawful if it becomes prolonged without an individualized determination of 
justification for detention and ordering individualized detention hearings for migrants held 
under a mandatory detention regime for six months or longer); Heeren, supra note 11, at 602–
04 (describing prolonged detention of migrants in mandatory detention and unavailability of 
procedures for challenging detention); Cole, supra note 10, at 1026 (noting that mandatory 
detention results in unjustified detention lacking in an adequate individualized determination 
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regarding detention, with the opportunity for review and release from detention.67 
The custody determination process is expected to determine the need to detain based 
on specific objective considerations of flight risk or danger to the community 
presented by a particular migrant. Even international human rights bodies, which 
have insisted on stringent limitations on immigration detention, generally 
countenance the availability of bond as a means for securing release from detention 
for migrants.68  
However, a closer look reveals that the custody determination process in the U.S. 
immigration system does not offer individualized consideration and review of the 
need for detention. Instead, the custody determination process for release-eligible 
migrants in pending deportation proceedings has followed a path similar to manda-
tory detention. While individual custody decisions are issued in cases of release-
eligible migrants in deportation proceedings, those decisions are not based on 
individual characteristics of the migrants justifying detention. Instead, the system 
defaults to deprivation of liberty based on standards and practices that presume that 
release-eligible individuals in deportation proceedings should and will be detained 
as a baseline. The limited review available fails to resolve the problem, because it 
does not direct the inquiry into the necessity of detention in a particular case in order 
to invalidate detention where unjustified and secure release. The promise of individ-
ualized determinations and review of custody are thus illusory, making detention of 
release-eligible migrants essentially automatic for at least some period and putting 
liberty beyond reach for too many. 
1. Development of Detention as a Default 
These problematic features of the custody determination process for release-
eligible migrants, who are awaiting hearings and a decision in immigration court 
deportation proceedings, are of relatively recent vintage. Traditionally, in line with 
constitutional standards, pretrial immigration detention was the exception rather than 
the rule. The case law of the BIA held that: “An alien generally is not and should not 
                                                                                                                 
 
of the need for detention); Legomsky, supra note 11, at 546–49 (noting the likelihood that 
mandatory detention will lead to unnecessary detention). 
 67. E.g., Kalhan, supra note 10, at 45, 48, 54 (favorably contrasting “individualized bond 
hearings” with mandatory detention schemes); Legomsky, supra note 11, at 549 (urging case-
by-case custody determinations rather than mandatory detention); Margaret H. Taylor, 
Dangerous by Decree: Detention without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 
149, 170–71 (2004) (urging the requirement of a “bond hearing” in the face of efforts to ex-
pand mandatory detention and no-bond mandates); Eunice Lee, Coast to Coast, Federal 
Courts Say NO to Mandatory Lock-up of Immigrants, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 
22, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/coast-coast-federal-courts-say-no 
-mandatory-lock-immigrants [https://perma.cc/SBY5-S8DX] (“Fortunately, thanks to 
ACLU's victories, immigrants picked up by ICE in their communities must now be given the 
basic due process of a bond hearing.”). 
 68. See, e.g., François Crépeau (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, ¶¶ 53, 56, 59, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/20/24 (Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2012 Report] (citing with ap-
proval bail and bond systems in various countries); UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra 
note 63, at Guideline 4. 
176 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:157 
 
be detained or required to post bond except on a finding that he is a threat to the 
national security, or that he is a poor bail risk.”69 Even when the immigration laws 
began to favor detention over release for certain individuals with criminal convic-
tions, there was still a robust presumption against detention for all other migrants.70 
In addition, decisions to detain or impose bond received meaningful review.71  
Then, in 1996, fueled by politics urging “get tough” measures in immigration and 
criminal systems alike, Congress adopted legislation that prioritized an enforcement 
approach to immigration.72 The legislation expanded mandatory detention to broad 
categories of migrants in deportation proceedings who had criminal histories. When 
mandatory detention became the law for certain groups of migrants, the custody 
determination process for those not subjected to mandatory detention changed its 
character as well.  
New regulations addressing detention for release-eligible migrants were adopted 
in 1997 at the same time as adoption of regulations to implement the 1996 mandatory 
detention law.73 The 1997 regulations reversed the prior rule requiring release of a 
migrant absent an individual finding of significant flight risk or danger to the com-
munity. Notwithstanding constitutional principles treating liberty as the rule, the 
regulations now imposed a presumption of detention, with the possibility of a mi-
grant making a showing of low risk sufficient to persuade an immigration officer to 
release.74 The same regulation also confirmed that “arriving aliens” seeking asylum 
and those with prior deportation orders would be detained and might be released only 
exceptionally.75 
The regulations that govern initial custody determinations, after adoption of the 
1997 regulations, thus specifically provide that DHS should not release a detained 
migrant, unless the migrant “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer” that he 
or she would not pose a danger or a likelihood of absconding.76 This standard does 
more than simply allocate the burden of proof for a custody determination to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976) (citations omitted), 1976 WL 32348, at *1. 
 70. See Drysdale, 20 I. & N. Dec. 815, 816–17 (B.I.A. 1994), 1994 WL 232084, at *2 
(establishing presumption of detention for individuals convicted of an aggravated felony, but 
not others, and still requiring release upon a showing of lack of flight risk or danger to the 
community). 
 71. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 553 (“Immigration judges play an extremely active role in 
review of . . . bail decisions.”). 
 72. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Jonathan S. Landay, Legal 
Immigrants Deported if They Have a Criminal Past, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 5, 1996), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0905/090596.us.us.4.html [https://perma.cc/G7CE-UN9V] 
(noting the role of “strong anti-immigrant and get-tough-on-crime sentiments that have 
emerged around the country” in the adoption of the 1996 legislation). 
 73. 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (1997). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 10320 (for arriving asylum seekers, “discretion to release from custody will [be] 
on a case-by-case basis”); id. at 10326, 10379 (reaffirming detention for cases involving a 
prior removal order regardless of refugee claim). 
 76. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016). 
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migrant, which might be problematic on its own.77 It allows, or more accurately re-
quires, detention without resolution of the threshold question of whether a risk of 
flight or danger to the community requiring detention exists. Individualized consid-
eration of flight risk and danger become relevant only in determining whether DHS 
would consider subsequent release based on a migrant’s showing and, if so, in setting 
conditions to be met for such release to occur.  
The immigration authorities acknowledged the change wrought in 1997.78 The 
new rule was explicitly intended to achieve “increased detention.”79  
The BIA soon reversed its previous course as well and directed the immigration 
courts to follow the new legal standard presuming detention.80 Determinations re-
garding the need to detain in release-eligible cases thus went the direction of manda-
tory detention cases. 
This outcome was not required, or permitted, by the 1996 legislation or by con-
stitutional developments that took place in the legislation’s aftermath. The 1996 
legislation did not alter the statutory provisions allowing for release of individuals 
not subject to mandatory detention. And, in 2001, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
presumption of liberty in the immigration context in its Zadvydas v. Davis decision 
and insisted that immigration detention must be justified in an individual case.81 Fur-
ther, in its Demore v. Kim decision upholding the 1996 mandatory detention legisla-
tion, the Supreme Court established that mandatory detention is a carve-out to the 
general detention regime.82 The Court confirmed that mandatory detention was in-
tended to affect only a specific “subset” of people who are deportable based on 
certain crimes, leaving the detention regime otherwise intact.83 In its approval of 
mandatory detention in Demore, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the 
categorical approach to detention applied only, for a brief detention period, to a “lim-
ited class” of migrants that Congress deemed to present a particular flight risk or 
danger to the community based on available information.84 In doing so, the Court 
reaffirmed the importance of the requirement of individualized determinations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See Das, supra note 9, at 156–58 (suggesting that placing the burden of proof on the 
migrant is problematic from an institutional design perspective because the migrant does not 
have access to necessary information and immigration authorities need greater incentives to 
develop the relevant information). 
 78. 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (noting the reversal of the presumption). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *1 (“An alien in 
a custody determination . . . must establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge and 
this Board that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the 
national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.”); Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1112–
13, 1116 (B.I.A. 1999), 1999 WL 1100900, at *10, 12 (holding that the regulations require a 
migrant seeking release in a custody redetermination hearing to “demonstrate” lack of flight 
risk and danger to the community). 
 81. 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001). 
 82. 538 U.S. 510, 518, 521 (2003) (emphasizing that mandatory detention is a 
Congressional mandate that applies only to a “limited class” or “subset” of deportable 
individuals). 
 83. Id. at 521. 
 84. Id. at 518–20; see also id. at 526 (describing the mandatory detention statute as a 
“narrow” detention policy).  
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justifying detention, based on flight risk or danger to the community, as the general 
rule.85 The courts have never approved the constitutionality of a broad presumption 
of detention for release-eligible individuals.86 
If anything, the legislative expansion of mandatory detention should have led to 
reinforcement of the existing system of presumptive release and individualized de-
terminations regarding detention in all release-eligible cases as a counterweight to 
mandatory detention. In this way the overall immigration detention regime would be 
aligned with the limited acceptable purposes of civil immigration detention.87 After 
all, the expansion of mandatory detention made it likely that migrants who presented 
a serious danger or flight risk, along with many who might not, would already be 
subject to mandatory detention. Those remaining eligible for release would be least 
likely to present individual factors suggesting the need for detention.  
Nevertheless, the “get tough” turn in immigration enforcement and the resulting 
1997 regulatory regime set a tone and legal framework for detention of release-
eligible migrants as an automatic default. This shift allowed and encouraged addi-
tional detention-focused developments and implementation practices described 
below. As a result, unjustifiably broad detention of release-eligible migrants has be-
come the norm.  
2. Non-Individualized Presumptive Detention in  
Initial DHS Custody Determinations 
a. DHS Implementation of Detention as Default 
Pursuant to the 1997 regulatory framework, DHS issues a decision to detain in its 
initial custody determination in most cases. Detention is the default, which means 
that detention is the result of DHS custody determination decisions; release is the 
unusual exception. There is no meaningful inquiry into the need to detain to address 
individualized flight or danger risks before detention, beyond initial apprehension 
and processing, takes place.88 Detention is automatic in a way that necessarily con-
travenes basic liberty principles requiring individualized determination of necessity. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See id. at 531–32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (limiting mandatory detention to cases 
where the government has established a likelihood of removability and noting that “ordinary 
bond procedures” would otherwise apply to determine whether a migrant “would pose a risk 
of flight or a danger to the community” if released). 
 86. See Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 14–11421, 2016 WL 3344236, at *30 (11th Cir. 
June 15, 2016) (Pryor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[N]either the Supreme 
Court nor this circuit has ever before addressed whether the regulations governing [detention 
for release-eligible individuals subject to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)] satisfy due process require-
ments.”); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding it unnecessary 
to reach the issue in the only case directly challenging the regulation that places the burden 
regarding release on the migrant). 
 87. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001). 
 88. The decision to detain is distinct from the original decision to apprehend. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.3(d) (2016) (noting that arrest must be followed in forty-eight hours by decision whether 
to continue in custody). DHS may initially apprehend a migrant and place that individual in 
immigration court deportation proceedings but should not detain without an individualized 
determination that such detention is necessary.  
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To understand this result, it is critical to consider the binary detention/release de-
cision as the central liberty issue. In other words, the focus of the analysis must be 
on whether the DHS custody determination results in release or results in continued 
detention, even if only for some period of time. Detention beyond initial apprehen-
sion necessarily constitutes a deprivation of liberty even if release is later secured. 
On this binary, detention is the result in almost all cases as seen upon further analysis 
of the possible results of the initial DHS custody determination.89  
As noted above, the DHS decision after apprehension may be simply to continue 
detention, which would be the presumptive option under the regulation.90 Alterna-
tively, the decision may be to detain until certain conditions are fulfilled that will 
allow for release, almost always payment of a monetary bond. This decision will also 
result in detention for at least a period of time until the bond condition is paid or 
modified. In effect, a decision of detention with the possibility of release on bond is 
a decision to detain for at least some period, which often becomes detention for a 
prolonged period or throughout the deportation proceedings.91 The government has 
acknowledged that such a decision, setting a bond requirement, is one of detention, 
albeit allowing for the possibility of release after payment of the bond.92 In the crimi-
nal justice context, analysts have similarly clarified that a decision to impose bond 
is “not release.”93 Thus, as a binary detention/release question, the first two possible 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-286: NOTICE OF CUSTODY 
DETERMINATION (providing for DHS to indicate detention, to set a particular bond amount as 
a condition of release, or to order release on “recognizance”). 
 90. This determination is often referred to as a “no bond” decision. However, it is more 
accurate to identify its fundamental nature as a decision to detain rather than as a decision 
regarding bond. DHS regularly issues such decisions to detain without the possibility for re-
lease on bond in its initial custody determination. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 6, 
at 25 (reporting results of attorney survey which found that DHS regularly makes such 
detention decisions across the board in certain facilities). 
 91. See, e.g., NYIRS Report, supra note 7, at 13 (almost 50% of migrants who received 
a decision allowing release on bond remained detained because of inability to pay). In practice, 
in the author’s experience, even when an affordable bond is assessed by ICE or the immigra-
tion court and the detainee’s family is prepared to pay it, the migrant remains detained for an 
additional period, often extending days or even weeks, while the logistics and paperwork of 
bond payment and release take place. The period of detention may be cut short through an 
immigration court custody redetermination decision on review that orders release on recogni-
zance or on an affordable bond. However, the limits on immigration court review described 
below substantially weaken this possibility. See infra Part II.A.3.  
 92. E.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-15-22, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT’S ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (REVISED) 25 
(2015) [hereinafter OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION] (clarifying that bond eli-
gibility is considered after a decision to detain is made); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
DHS/ICE/PIA-015(d), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT 
INTEGRATED DATABASE (EID), RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA 1.0), ENFORCE 
ALIEN REMOVAL MODULE (EARM 5.0), AND CRIME ENTRY SCREEN (CES 2.0) 4–5 (2012) 
[hereinafter RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy 
/privacy_piaupdate_EID_april2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZXV-2J2P] (same). 
 93. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONEY AS A 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER 64 (2014); see also MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NAT’L INST. OF 
CORR., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL 
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DHS determinations regarding custody are decisions to detain. DHS generally adopts 
one of these two determinations in its initial custody determination and so detains.  
The DHS custody determination might instead result in a decision to release on 
recognizance (also known as conditional parole), which would be the only decision 
on the binary that would not result in detention and would instead lead to immediate 
release.94 Such a decision could contain conditions on release, such as reporting re-
quirements, that could be imposed after release and would not require continued de-
tention. However, with a default of detention, it is rare for migrants to be released on 
their own recognizance or conditional parole. The data is very limited but suggests 
that only 1–9% of DHS detainees are released directly on their own recognizance or 
conditional parole without the requirement of a monetary bond.95 Outright release is 
                                                                                                                 
 
PRINCIPLES, LAWS, AND RESEARCH TO THE FIELD OF PRETRIAL SERVICES 18–19 (2007) (noting, 
in the criminal pretrial detention context, that often the “outcome is detention” when bonds 
are imposed). 
 94. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) (referencing “conditional parole”).  
 95. NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT & 
FAMILIES FOR FREEDOM, INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON 
IMMIGRANT DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (2012) 
[hereinafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES] (migrants detained in the New York City area were re-
leased on their own recognizance in less than 1% of cases; defendants in the criminal justice 
system were thirty-seven times more likely to be released on their own recognizance); 
Detainees Leaving ICE Detention from the South Texas Contract Detention Facility, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/201509/STCDFTX/exit/ [https://perma.cc 
/44D6-NGQ7] (at one of the largest immigration detention centers in the country, only 43 out 
of 9510 detainees leaving DHS custody in 2015 were released on recognizance set either by 
DHS or by an immigration judge; a total of only 1.9% of detainees left the facility on a grant 
of recognizance, parole, or order of supervision); Decisions on ICE Detainees: State-by-State 
Details, supra note 7 (noting that, nationally, 4% of detainees were released on their own 
recognizance from initial place of detention and 6.6% were released on their own recognizance 
at some point during their detention from November to December of 2012). Government data 
for fiscal year 2013 reports that 662,000 migrants were apprehended, SIMANSKI, supra note 3, 
at 1, with just under 30,000 released on their own recognizance, which is a 4% rate of release 
on recognizance, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO 
DETENTION: IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS 
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014) [hereinafter GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION]. Even 
then, the data does not show whether the release on recognizance took place immediately after 
apprehension or after some period of detention during pending deportation proceedings. See 
GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra, at 8. Including releases on parole and alternatives 
to detention, which do not always qualify as releases on recognizance because they often 
involve a monetary bond, the percentage rises only to 9%. See id. (providing data showing 
that approximately 60,000 migrants were released on recognizance, parole or alternatives to 
detention). These percentages are based on releases as a portion of total numbers of 
apprehensions, rather than just release-eligible pretrial detainees; the release numbers may 
therefore include some individuals subject to final orders or mandatory detention who are not 
the focus of this Article. The percentage of those released without a bond requirement would 
likely be higher if it were possible to consider a smaller baseline group of only those who are 
eligible for release in pending deportation proceedings. The statistics nonetheless establish the 
rarity of decisions releasing without a monetary bond requirement. 
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extremely unlikely, then, and the DHS initial custody determination decision is thus 
one of detention. 
DHS also defaults to detention for the subset of release-eligible migrants—“ar-
riving” asylum seekers and those with prior deportation orders—who are in pending 
deportation proceedings but do not fall directly under the general regime for a DHS 
custody determination.96 Under the regulations and guidance applicable in these 
cases, DHS does not make a determination of the need to detain on an individualized 
basis after apprehension; instead, detention is explicitly automatic.97 DHS may sub-
sequently decide to release at its discretion, but only after detention is automatically 
imposed.98 For “arriving” asylum seekers, a policy memorandum from 2009 requires 
consideration of release after a favorable screening interview, but only where the 
asylum seeker “establishes to the satisfaction of [the DHS officer] his or her identity 
and that he or she presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community.”99 The 
presumption is one of detention even at the point when DHS may consider release. 
A monetary bond may also be imposed before release will be secured, both for “ar-
riving” asylum seekers and those with prior deportation orders seeking refugee 
protection.100 So the DHS custody decision generally leads to continued detention 
for at least some time for these groups as well.101   
Thus, under the applicable regulatory framework, the initial DHS custody deter-
mination results in a decision to detain, after apprehension, for almost all release-
eligible migrants in pending immigration court deportation proceedings.102 And, be-
cause there is no mechanism for immediate and automatic review of the detention, the 
migrant is held firmly in custody under this initial determination, for at least some period.  
b. DHS Policy and Practice Leading to Non-Individualized Detention Decisions 
DHS policy and practice in making initial custody determinations further ensures 
automatic resort to detention for release-eligible migrants pending adjudication of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 97. 8 C.F.R. § 241.3 (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (2016); 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10320 (Mar. 6, 
1997) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.). 
 98. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2016). 
 99. PAROLE DIRECTIVE, supra note 32, at 3. 
 100. Id. at 7; 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b). 
 101. See, e.g., Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 2278 
Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 109 (2013 (statement of Mary Meg 
McCarthy, Executive Director, National Immigrant Justice Center) (noting that release of asy-
lum seekers under parole memo is limited); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 6, at 13 (noting 
that parole was not granted in 53% of cases of “arriving alien” asylum seekers who had passed 
the asylum screening interview in 2015); DAVID HAUSMAN, ACLU IMMIGRANT RIGHTS’ 
PROJECT, FACT SHEET: WITHHOLDING-ONLY CASES AND DETENTION 2 (2015), https://www.aclu 
.org/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-withholding-only-cases-and-detention [https://perma.cc/HP3K-LAKS] 
(finding that migrants with prior deportation orders seeking refugee protection remained 
detained throughout their deportation proceedings in over 85% of cases). 
 102. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 50 (calculating 91% detention rate by DHS 
in initial custody determination, based on analysis of government documents, while noting 
that an important percentage of migrants included in this figure were subject to mandatory 
detention).  
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their cases. The considerations weighed by DHS in implementing its custody deter-
mination mandate frequently bear little relation to the need to detain a particular in-
dividual in order to address flight risk or danger and instead push towards a detention 
decision regardless of justification.  
DHS often detains to fill the physical space available for detention of migrants. 
Bed space has always impacted immigration detention decisions.103 However, in the 
past, detention availability was limited, requiring release without a serious individu-
alized assessment of risk in some cases.104 Now, the opposite is true. Increased fund-
ing of immigration enforcement has led to an exponential increase in the space avail-
able for immigration detention in the United States; from 1995 to 2014, the number 
of daily funded beds increased from 7500 to 34,000.105 By the government’s own 
admission, there are generally more beds available than individuals who require de-
tention based on an established flight risk or danger to the community.106 Thus, even 
if an individualized determination would reveal no need for detention, the official 
making the final decision is hard-pressed to execute release if bed space is currently 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (citing legislative history establishing that 
funding and detention space limitations affected release determinations); HARWOOD, supra 
note 12, at 120–21 (noting varying detention rates in different jurisdictions based on available 
detention space). 
 104. See HARWOOD, supra note 12, at 120–21 (in immigration areas having limited space, 
individuals might be released even if they “lacked the equities normally needed to qualify for 
release”). 
 105. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32369, IMMIGRATION-RELATED 
DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12 (2012); SCHRIRO, supra note 58, at 2; U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FISCAL 
YEAR 2015 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT SALARIES AND EXPENSES 42 (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files 
/publications/DHS-Congressional-Budget-Justification-FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDR8 
-4JTB] [hereinafter 2015 ICE BUDGET REQUEST] (page 1290 in full version of DHS Budget 
Request). 
 106. 2015 ICE BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 105, at 4, 40 (pages 1252 and 1288 in full 
version of DHS Budget Request) (seeking appropriations for fewer beds in 2015 than in pre-
vious years and stating that these beds will be sufficient to accommodate priority high-risk 
detainees). The increased bed space is therefore not attributable to an increase in the number 
of individuals who are likely candidates for detention. This point is further borne out by the 
statistics showing that the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States who 
would be subject to detention and deportation and the number of unauthorized border crossers 
have decreased in recent years rather than increased. See U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL 
ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2015 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UYF-9GLY] (reporting over 1.6 million unlawful border crossers 
apprehended in fiscal year 2000 and only 337,117 apprehensions in fiscal year 2015); ANA 
GONZALEZ-BARRERA, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MORE MEXICANS LEAVING THAN COMING TO 
THE U.S. 5–6 (2015) (showing net loss of Mexican migrants, who make up the largest 
nationality group subject to detention and deportation proceedings, from 2009 to 2014); 
Robert Warren, US Undocumented Population Drops Below 11 Million in 2014, with 
Continued Declines in the Mexican Undocumented Population, 4 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. 
SECURITY 1, 1 (2016) (undocumented population in the United States has declined steadily 
since 2008 and, in 2014, fell below 11 million for the first time since 2004). 
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available and there are no other migrants to be detained with more serious indicia of 
flight risk or danger to the community.107  
DHS faces significant pressure to keep the available detention beds full and has 
the ability under the applicable regulatory framework to do so, resulting in automatic 
detention based on bed space rather than individual characteristics. Congress has 
regularly mandated in recent years that DHS shall maintain the current high number 
of detention beds, specifically requiring “not less than 34,000 detention beds.”108 The 
Secretary of DHS has indicated that he does not understand this mandate to require 
detention of 34,000 individuals but only maintenance of detention space.109 How-
ever, this interpretation is contested, and the existence of the financed beds pushes 
in favor of automatic detention anyway.110 Rather than making decisions based on 
the individual characteristics of detainees, DHS will generally detain until the point 
at which detention space is exhausted, which leads overwhelmingly to detention ra-
ther than release in the cases presented for decision.111  
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. See Sharita Gruberg, No Way Out: Congress’ Bed Quota Traps LGBT Immigrants in 
Detention, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, (May 14, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org 
/issues/lgbt/news/2015/05/14/111832/no-way-out-congress-bed-quota-traps-lgbt-immigrants 
-in-detention/ [https://perma.cc/5CJG-6CNB] (citing FOIA documents establishing that the 
DHS risk classification assessment tool provided release as an option in 70% of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) cases, but ICE nonetheless detained LGBT persons in 68% 
of those instances presumably because of available bed space). 
 108. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. 113-76, Div. F., 128 Stat. 5, 251; 
REP. JOHN CARTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2015, H.R. 
REP. NO. 113-481, at 50 (2014) (proposing language regarding the requirement of 34,000 beds 
for 2015); Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives 
-immigration-detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DC6C-GFPG] (noting that appropriations legislation has contained the bed 
mandate since 2006). 
 109. United States Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 87 (2014) (testimony of Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec.). 
 110. See SEN. JOHN HOEVEN, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS 
BILL, 2016, S. REP. NO. 114-68, at 53 (2015) (indicating that congressional leaders expect ICE 
to use all available bed space). 
 111. See Sarah Childress, Why ICE Released Those 2,000 Immigrant Detainees, PBS: 
FRONTLINE (Mar. 19, 2013) (then-head of ICE, John Morton, reporting that ICE released low-
risk detainees in early 2013 when the numbers of detainees began to exceed the 34,000 beds 
available); E-mail from Philip T. Miller, Assistant Director for Field Operations, to Field 
Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors (Apr. 14, 2014, 12:10 p.m.) (e-mail ob-
tained through FOIA Response to Andrew Free on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (includ-
ing message to all ICE field office directors, entitled “Detention Maximization Strategies,” 
seeking suggestions to “more fully utilize the 34,000 beds available nationwide”); E-mail from 
[REDACTED], to [REDACTED] (Sept. 17, 2013) (hereinafter Sept. 17, 2013 ICE e-mail) 
(e-mail obtained through FOIA Response to National Immigrant Justice Center on file with 
the Indiana Law Journal) (directing ICE officers to lower bond amounts imposed after a 
particular date, across the board, because area detention space “is close to maximum bed space 
capacity”); E-mail from [REDACTED], Assistant Director for Field Operations to Field 
Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors (Jan. 13, 2012, 03:48 p.m.) (e-mail 
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Even absent a congressional mandate to maintain specific levels of detention 
space, the availability of generous funding for immigration detention spaces would 
likely continue to drive detention policy and decision making in a manner that pre-
sumes detention without regard to established need in individual cases. Neither DHS, 
which receives the detention budget funding, nor the for-profit corporate entities that 
receive payments from DHS to manage detention centers have incentives to decrease 
the available funding for detention slots.112 In turn, DHS will generally fill the large 
number of beds that are funded, absent a framework that requires a firm focus on the 
necessity of detention in each particular case.  
DHS has a further practice of implementing blanket detention policies, which es-
chew altogether any individualized consideration of need in initial DHS custody de-
terminations for entire groups of migrants. More than once, DHS has insisted on 
detention of categories of release-eligible migrants in pending immigration court de-
portation proceedings, without the possibility of release.113 In these cases, in its initial 
                                                                                                                 
 
obtained through FOIA Response to National Immigrant Justice Center on file with the 
Indiana Law Journal) (directing all ICE field office directors to offer suggestions regarding 
migrants who might be detained to “meet . . . congressional mandate of 34,000 beds”); see 
also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 6, at 31 (quoting deposition of ICE assistant field office 
director who stated that parole decisions are based on the availability of bed space). 
 112. See Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 185–86 (noting that for-profit entities 
lobby in their financial self-interest, including for services that government agencies do not 
need, and that “the privatization of the detention system incentivizes detention growth”). In 
some cases, the form of government contracts for detention space create even greater incen-
tives for filling all available detention spaces by requiring payment to the for-profit manage-
ment company of a detention facility for a specific number of beds regardless of whether they 
are filled. The agency may well consider that it is better to utilize the detention spots that have 
already been purchased. See generally DET. WATCH NETWORK & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, BANKING ON DETENTION 1 (2015) (providing data on facilities that have “guaranteed 
minimum” contracts with ICE for detention). In any case, government agencies generally act 
to use their full budgets to ensure their continuation, particularly where encouraged to do so 
by the private sector benefitting from the expenditures of the budget dollars. See David A. 
Fahrenthold, As Congress Fights over the Budget, Agencies Go on Their ‘Use It or Lose It’ 
Shopping Sprees, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as 
-congress-fights-over-the-budget-agencies-go-on-their-use-it-or-lose-it-shopping-sprees/2013 
/09/28/b8eef3cc-254c-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html [https://perma.cc/3VZV-CYL9]. 
 113. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 580–81 (Att’y Gen. 2003), 2003 WL 1953693, at *6 
(concluding that Haitian “seagoing migrants” should not be released as a categorical matter); 
E-mail from Thomas Homan, Executive Associate Director, to Assistant Directors, Deputy 
Assistant Directors, Field Office Directors, Deputy Field Office Directors, and Assistant Field 
Office Directors (Feb. 9, 2015, 4:09 PM) (e-mail obtained through FOIA Response to Andrew 
Free on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (including message sent by ICE Executive 
Associate Director to field offices stating that all migrants deemed an enforcement priority, 
including recently arriving asylum seekers, should be detained without opportunity for release 
except in “compelling and exceptional circumstances”); E-mail from David D. Rivera, New 
Orleans Field Office Director, to [REDACTED] (Jan. 26, 2015, 3:30 PM (e-mail obtained 
through FOIA Response to Andrew Free on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (containing 
message from New Orleans Field Office Director authorizing detention without the possibility 
for release for entire migrant categories even where DHS risk classification assessment tool 
recommends release). See generally Taylor, supra note 67 (describing various government 
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custody determination, DHS not only makes the decision to detain automatically but 
orders ongoing detention without the possibility of subsequent release on bond or 
other conditions.114 Such policies were adopted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
2001.115 Most recently, in the summer of 2014, DHS adopted a policy of detention 
without the possibility for release on bond for mothers and children arriving from 
Central America to seek asylum in the United States.116 In these cases, DHS explic-
itly refused for many months to consider individual circumstances relating to flight 
risk or danger before imposing detention, without the possibility for release on bond 
or any other conditions, in its initial custody determinations.117  
The adoption by DHS of an automated risk classification assessment tool, in 2013, 
has not curbed automatic DHS detention decisions.118 In principle, the tool considers 
characteristics of individual migrants to assist DHS in reaching a custody determi-
nation.119 However, this tool has not overcome the presumption of detention and the 
practical considerations that guide DHS custody determinations and so does not en-
sure that detention is limited to those individual cases where it is needed to address 
flight risk or danger-to-the-community considerations.  
First, the tool is not publicly available, limiting its usefulness in allowing for 
                                                                                                                 
 
policies that led to across-the-board detention of various categories of migrants without op-
portunity for release, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).  
 114. Of course, the immigration court may review the DHS initial custody determination 
and order the possibility for release on bond at a later hearing. However, DHS often urges the 
courts not to intervene when it makes these group-based detention determinations. See D-J-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 580-81 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2003), 2003 WL 1953603, at *7 (decision or-
dering immigration courts and BIA to abide by Attorney General’s dictate that members of 
certain migrant groups should be detained without the opportunity for release on bond); Class 
Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief ¶¶ 47-53, R.I.L–R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 
170 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 15-11) (describing pattern of DHS attorneys arguing against immi-
gration court review of categorical decisions to detain certain asylum-seeking families without 
opportunity for release). 
 115. See Taylor, supra note 67, at 149–50. 
 116. Class Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, supra note 114, at ¶¶ 4–5; 
Guillermo Contreras, Feds Start ‘No Bond’ Policy on Immigrants at Karnes, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014, 10:29 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article 
/Feds-start-no-bond-policy-on-immigrants-at-5716884.php [https://perma.cc/7W9Z-6QRA]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REDACTED FORM I-286: NOTICE OF CUSTODY 
DETERMINATION (completed forms for families detained at the Karnes City Facility on file 
with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 117. See Class Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, supra note 114 ¶ 1. 
 118. DHS does not use the tool in all cases where custody decisions are made. U.S. GAO, 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 8. For example, the tool is not used for indi-
viduals in expedited removal after they pass their screening interviews and become eligible 
for release. Instead, it is used only when they are first detained and are still ineligible for 
release as the result of an expedited removal order. See OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO 
DETENTION, supra note 92, at 13. 
 119. RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 4; Detention Reform 
Accomplishments, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/detention-reform#tab1 [https://perma.cc/GN3H-SQYB]. 
As described below, the particular factors considered by the tool have not been tested for their 
relevance or predictive strength. See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text. 
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meaningful individualized determinations by preventing individuals with knowledge 
of relevant detainee information from providing that information for evaluation.120 
Second, while the lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the tool’s ap-
proach, information provided about the tool suggests that it treats detention as the 
default position.121 As such, it reinforces the automatic resort to detention under the 
existing legal framework and practice. The tool serves principally to determine de-
tention classifications and to set conditions under which a detainee might 
subsequently achieve release, usually a bond requirement, rather than analyzing the 
individual need to detain.122 For these reasons, deployment of the tool in the last 
several years has not led to any notable change in detention rates.123 
There is one more indicator that individualized determination of the necessity of 
detention is not the foundation for DHS custody determinations. For migrants de-
tained pending proceedings, DHS does not periodically evaluate the ongoing need to 
detain. After the initial determination, DHS reconsiders detention only at its discre-
tion based on a request from the detainee or on its own initiative as a result of a new 
policy or similar change.124 A system of detention based on individual determina-
tions of necessity would require regular review of the need to detain an individual to 
ensure that the evaluation of flight risk or danger is still valid.125 Yet, such review 
does not take place. 
3. Lack of Review of Necessity of Detention in Immigration 
Court Custody Redetermination Hearings 
Immigration court custody redetermination hearings also fail to protect liberty, 
because they do not serve to limit detention to those individual cases where it is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 171 (noting that ICE has not publicized 
the criteria used). 
 121. See OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 92, at 25 (showing that 
the risk classification assessment tool recommended release without a bond requirement less 
than 1% of the time in 2013); RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 3–4 (ex-
plaining that the tool helps determine whether an individual should be “detained or released 
on bond or under other supervision” without any possibility for release without conditions); 
GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 8 (the tool recommended release, with-
out clarity as to whether a bond was to be required, for only 9% of migrants to whom the tool 
was applied in fiscal year 2013). The data regarding releases differs between government re-
ports, making it harder still to assess the functioning of the tool. 
 122. See RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 4 (bond considered after 
determination in favor of detention). 
 123. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 1 (2013) (announc-
ing that, for fiscal year 2012, “ICE detained approximately 478,000 foreign nationals, an all-
time high”); SIMANSKI, supra note 3, at 1 (announcing that, for fiscal year 2013, “ICE detained 
nearly 441,000 aliens”). 
 124. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(2) (2016); RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, 
at 4 n.6. 
 125. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 60607 (1979) (establishing that mental health 
commitment of a child must be independently reviewed periodically to evaluate continuing 
need for deprivation of liberty). 
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justified by flight risk or danger. The court custody redetermination hearings do not 
provide prompt and meaningful review of the initial DHS detention decision in order 
to secure immediate release where necessity is not established.  
As to “arriving aliens,” and individuals with prior deportation orders, the immi-
gration courts do not offer jurisdiction to redetermine custody status at all.126 For entire 
groups of migrants, then, there is no possibility to seek review of detention. The only 
recourse after a DHS detention decision is to make a request for release to DHS, the 
same enforcement entity that made the original decision and serves as custodian. 
In those cases where the immigration courts have jurisdiction, it is important to 
recognize that the opportunity to seek immigration court redetermination of custody 
does not eliminate the fact of detention, under the initial DHS decision to detain, 
prior to review. Because the immigration court custody redetermination hearing gen-
erally takes place some weeks after detention is ordered,127 and only where the de-
tainee requests such reconsideration, the role of the immigration courts in reviewing 
the initial detention decision is limited.128 This system is thus not set up to verify 
immediately the need to detain or to ensure the accuracy of a DHS decision that 
detention is necessary, in order to ensure prompt release where detention is not 
supported.129  
Immigration courts are also limited in their review of a DHS decision to detain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(11) 
(2016) (precluding immigration court custody redetermination hearings where disallowed by 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)) (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2016) (disallowing immigra-
tion court custody redetermination hearings for “arriving” aliens); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2016) 
(providing for immigration court custody redetermination hearings only for individuals held 
in detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)); E-mail from Marlen Piñeiro, Assistant Dir. For 
Repatriation, & Philip Miller, Assistant Dir. For Field Operations, to Assistant Dirs., Deputy 
Assistant Dirs., Field Office Dirs., & Deputy Field Office Dirs. (July 31, 2014, 2:57 PM) 
(e-mail obtained through FOIA Response to Andrew Free on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal) (setting out DHS interpretation that individuals with prior deportation orders who 
seek refugee protection are held under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) and noting that generally 
immigration court custody redetermination hearings are unavailable for this group); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1241.14(a) (providing for immigration court custody hearings for migrants held under 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 in very limited circumstances that do not apply to individuals seeking refugee 
protection).  
 127. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (providing 
that immigration court custody redetermination hearings are not automatic but rather must be 
requested by the detained migrant and including no immediacy or other timing requirement 
for the conduct of such a hearing). 
 128. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (emphasizing review proce-
dures under the Bail Reform Act as intended to “further the accuracy of [the] determination” 
that detention is necessary before detention takes place). 
 129. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 8183 (noting limits on immigration court 
review and stating that “DHS both determines and executes initial detention”). The limited 
role of the immigration court in determining detention or release is further affirmed by a regu-
latory provision that allows DHS to “stay” the release of a migrant from detention during a 
DHS appeal of an immigration judge’s custody redetermination decision, even where the im-
migration judge has ordered release on recognizance or parole or upon payment of a bond, if 
DHS initially ordered detention or imposed a bond of $10,000 or higher. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(i)(2). 
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by a lack of full independence. Review of detention decisions by an independent 
authority is a critical safeguard of liberty.130 In the immigration context, the immi-
gration courts are within the Department of Justice rather than the Department of 
Homeland Security and so form part of a separate agency. However, the immigration 
courts within the Department of Justice and the DHS officers who make initial cus-
tody determinations both form part of the same executive branch. The vigor of im-
migration court review is conditioned by this reality. Where there is an executive 
policy relating to detention, the immigration courts must consider and generally ef-
fectuate that policy.131 Even in the absence of such a policy, DHS and the 
immigration courts coordinate handling of immigration cases.132 Given this 
relationship, the immigration courts do not provide sufficiently independent review 
of the initial DHS detention decision necessary to assess the individual need for 
detention and order release as appropriate. 
The case law also precludes any true scrutiny by the immigration courts of the 
threshold detention decision by insisting on broad deference to DHS decisions to 
detain.133 The BIA insists that detainees have no “right” to release and affirms “ex-
tremely broad discretion” in initial government decisions to detain or release.134 This 
precedent severely limits the ability of the immigration courts to effectuate an inde-
pendent review of a detention decision with the possibility of invalidating the deten-
tion and ordering immediate release. The original DHS default to detention is thus 
not meaningfully cabined by immigration court review.  
Instead, as with DHS, the immigration courts operate off of a presumption of de-
tention. The case law of the BIA establishes the same standard for immigration 
judges conducting custody redetermination hearings as applied to the initial decision 
by DHS.135 The BIA has determined that a detained migrant “must establish to the 
satisfaction of the Immigration Judge” that he or she does not present a danger or 
flight risk.136 This standard employed by the immigration courts considers custody 
in a posture that treats detention as the default position. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (referencing importance of “neutral decisionmaker”); 
UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 63, ¶ 47(iii) (requiring that an asylum seeker be 
brought before a “judicial or other independent authority” for review of detention); ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standards 10-5.9, 10-5.10 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N, 3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS] (emphasizing role of 
“judicial officer” in reviewing detention). 
 131. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 581 (Att’y Gen. 2003), 2003 WL 1953603, at *8 (ruling 
by Attorney General requiring immigration courts to engage in detention of broad groups in 
deference to national security considerations brought forward by other agencies in the 
executive). 
 132. See, e.g., Memorandum from Print Maggard, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office 
for Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges and All Court Administrators 4 (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/819736/download [https://perma.cc/U5JF-T8MB] 
(establishing a priority “rocket” docket for certain cases, including cases of unaccompanied 
and accompanied children, and clarifying that DHS will determine placement on the immi-
gration courts’ priority docket). 
 133. Das, supra note 9, at 158. 
 134. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *3. 
 135. See id. at 38. 
 136. Id. But cf. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) (imposing burden of 
2016] TO LOOSE THE BONDS  189 
 
The immigration courts are limited to adjudicating a detainee’s request for “ame-
lioration of the conditions under which he or she may be released.”137 The immigra-
tion courts are thus relegated to considering possible conditions of release, after the 
detention decision has taken place and has been carried out for some period.  
After skipping the inquiry into the decision to detain in the first place, the limited 
nature of immigration court custody redetermination hearings also makes it unlikely 
that the court will in fact order outright release even after a period of detention. If 
the immigration court does not order continued detention, the court will generally set 
a monetary bond as a condition of release. Once again, the immigration court 
decision will generally entail detention for at least some additional period, either with 
the opportunity for subsequent release on bond or without such opportunity.138 This 
decision does not involve scrutiny into the existence of a basis for continued 
detention based on flight risk or danger. 
The immigration court custody redetermination hearings mainly serve, then, to 
review and regulate financial bonds set as a condition for release after detention be-
gins.139 The Immigration Judge Benchbook and Immigration Court Practice Manual, 
both published by the agency that encompasses the immigration courts, cabin the 
immigration court decision into one of determining a bond amount as a condition for 
release. The Immigration Court Practice Manual explicitly limits immigration court 
review to “the authority to redetermine the amount of bond set by DHS.”140 The 
Immigration Judge Benchbook similarly emphasizes the decision regarding a bond 
amount, even insisting that the statute does not allow for release on recognizance.141 
In practice, many judges refuse to consider the possibility of an order of outright 
release on recognizance.142 Some judges do sparingly order release on recognizance, 
                                                                                                                 
 
proof on government in the 9th Circuit in immigration court custody redeterminations hearings 
required for specific subset of migrants subject to prolonged detention without such a hearing), 
cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204); 
Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 137. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 138. See ACLU OF S. CAL., RESTORING DUE PROCESS 2 (2014) (more than 30% of migrants 
assessed bond by the immigration courts, after a federal court order requiring immigration 
court custody redetermination hearings for individuals previously deemed subject to manda-
tory detention, were unable to post bond and achieve release). 
 139. See Ureña, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (B.I.A. 2009), 2009 WL 3983103, at *2 (if mi-
grant is not a danger, then the immigration court should “consider the other factors in the case 
relevant to determining the amount of bond necessary to ensure the respondent’s presence at 
further proceedings”); Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40, 2006 WL 3337627, at *3 (setting out 
factors to be considered in custody redetermination hearings in order to determine “the amount 
of bond that is appropriate”). 
 140. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 42, at § 9.3(a); see also EXEC. 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet: EOIR at a Glance, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/VB6R-8FDM] (last updated 
Jan. 8, 2016) (stating that the purpose of “bond redetermination hearings” is “to determine whether 
to lower or eliminate the amount of a bond set by DHS for an individual detained by DHS”). 
 141. IJ BOND BENCHBOOK, supra note 8, at § I.E.2–3. 
 142. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 6, at 4 (84% of attorneys responding to a survey 
indicated that immigration judges refuse to release individuals without a monetary bond 
requirement). 
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and litigation is underway that would require all immigration courts to consider the 
possibility for ordering release without payment of a bond.143 The guidance docu-
ments make evident, though, that the role of the immigration courts in the custody 
determination process is one of setting bond amounts, which result in continued de-
tention. There is little room for ordering immediate release on an individualized de-
termination that DHS erred in ordering detention where unnecessary or that contin-
ued detention is unjustified. On the detention/release binary, detention again prevails 
for at least some period, extending the period in detention begun by DHS. 
The BIA and the federal courts do not provide any more rigorous review of de-
tention on appeal. The BIA reviews the decision of the immigration court under the 
same standards that limit the scope of the immigration court’s inquiry.144 Addition-
ally, the BIA often does not decide custody determination appeals until after the final 
decision on the merits in the deportation proceedings, nullifying the appeal’s useful-
ness for obtaining liberty during the deportation proceedings, where merited.145  
There is no review by a federal court of the decision to detain, either.146 Federal 
court habeas consideration extends only to the legality of the detention decision-
making process.147 It does not address the merits of the need to detain, based on flight 
risk or danger, and so does not provide individualized review of detention decisions. 
4. The Overall Inadequacy of the Custody Determination Process 
as Control on Detention 
As a result of the combination of legal, practical, and policy realities just 
described, the custody determination process treats detention as the default, rather 
than the exception required by liberty principles, and does not offer prompt and 
meaningful review of the need for detention in individual cases. The system serves 
as an inadequate tool for protection of liberty and control of detention. 
Because pretrial detention of release-eligible individuals in deportation proceed-
ings is best described as automatic rather than limited to cases of individualized ne-
cessity, the custody determination process essentially treats every migrant in depor-
tation proceedings as posing a threat to security or a significant risk for failure to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. See Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539, 54344 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (discussing the 
request for supplemental briefing, issued in a separate case, on the issue of whether an immi-
gration judge can grant conditional parole or release on recognizance during a custody re-
determination hearing). 
 144. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3) (2016) (providing for BIA review within the section on 
immigration court review). 
 145. CHARLES ROTH & RAIA STOICHEVA, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ORDER IN THE 
COURT: COMMONSENSE SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS IN THE 
IMMIGRATION COURT 26 (2014); see also EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015, supra note 5, at 
R2 (showing receipts of bond appeals as greater than completions of bond appeals in a given 
fiscal year). 
 146. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012) (strictly limiting judicial review of custody decisions); see 
also Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[D]ecisions granting or 
denying bond are not subject to judicial review.”). 
 147. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); Kambo v. Poppell, No. SA-07-
CV-800-XR, 2007 WL 3051601, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2007). 
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appear at hearings.148 This presumption of risk cannot stand, however.149 Many mi-
grants have no history that would raise any suggestion of danger and have strong 
incentives to appear for their hearings in order to pursue opportunities to remain in 
the United States with stable legal status.150 Nor would it be reasonable to suggest 
that all migrants present a risk because they may not appear for physical removal if 
ordered removed.151 These migrants have not yet had a hearing on deportability or 
any claims to refugee protection or oher lawful status. It is premature to evaluate 
flight risk in terms of likelihood of appearance for deportation when many will never 
be deported but rather will obtain permission to remain permanently in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. E-mail from Thomas Homan, supra note 113 (including message from the ICE 
Executive Associate Director to field offices indicating that all priority enforcement catego-
ries, including recently-arriving asylum seekers, will “generally pose either a danger to per-
sons or property or a flight risk”). 
 149. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 69092 (2001) (requiring individualized 
determinations of both flight risk and dangerousness); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 667 (B.I.A. 
1976), 1976 WL 32348, at *1 (finding it impermissible to require a bond “of almost every 
alien who is held in deportation proceedings”). While every migrant might abscond under 
some set of circumstances, this reality should not be enough to presume meaningful flight risk 
preventing release. See SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 5152 (noting that “even someone whom 
we consider the lowest possible risk is still risky nonetheless” but the law allows only reason-
able mitigation of that risk). Some case law suggests that release, even on a bond condition, is 
only appropriate where the migrant presents no risk. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d at 1067 
(in setting bond the immigration judge “necessarily found . . . that [the migrant] did not pre-
sent a flight risk or a danger to the community, and thus merited release”) (emphasis in 
original). This suggestion is misplaced, even under interpretations of immigration law that 
presume detention. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) (permitting release when “the alien is 
likely to appear for any future proceeding”) (emphasis added); see also Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 
at 666, 1976 WL 32348, at *1 (allowing detention only where migrant is a “poor bail risk”) 
(emphasis added).  
 150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (providing for cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 
(2012) (providing for adjustment of status); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (providing for asylum); 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692 (noting that the potential for removal “bears no relation to a de-
tainee’s dangerousness”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FACILITY 
COSTS AND STANDARDS 8 (2014) (noting that about 44% of ICE detainees were of a low cus-
tody level between 2010 and 2013, with custody levels determined by looking at criminal 
history, attempts at escape and behavioral history). 
 151. See Khalifah, 21 I. & N. Dec. 107, 111 (B.I.A. 1995), 1995 WL 616505, at *4 (finding 
flight risk based on likelihood of nonappearance for deportation, as well as for hearings, where 
migrant had strong incentives to avoid deportation because of serious nonpolitical criminal 
proceedings against him in his home country). The government may have difficulty in appre-
hending an individual for deportation if not detained at the time of a final deportation order. 
However, that situation involves failings of the government rather than a risk presented by the 
migrant justifying detention. The government could redirect resources towards detention and 
deportation after a final order. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT NO. I-2003-004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S REMOVAL OF 
ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS vivii (2003) (recommending measures to ensure removals of 
nondetained individuals with final deportation orders).  
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States.152 There can be little doubt, then, that the system sweeps too broadly and 
sacrifices liberty without adequate justification.  
The immigration custody determination process certainly does not parallel the 
understanding of the individualized review required for pretrial administrative de-
tention in the criminal justice system, even though detention decisions in the two 
systems should be similarly nonpunitive and justified based on governmental inter-
ests relating to flight risk or danger to the community. The different treatment is 
particularly notable since migrants in deportation proceedings are equated with 
criminal defendants in other ways and the immigration detention system has imitated 
some aspects of criminal pretrial detention, as described below.153  
While imperfect in limiting pretrial detention in practice, in the criminal justice 
context, a presumption of pretrial release applies rather than a presumption of deten-
tion. The government must establish the necessity of detention based on individual-
ized reasons in each case before detaining. Otherwise, it must execute release.154 In 
addition, the initial decision regarding detention is immediately subject to the con-
sideration of an independent judicial officer to determine whether detention is nec-
essary or to order release, usually within forty-eight hours.155 This consideration is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (the justification of preventing flight “is weak or non-
existent where removal seems a remote possibility at best”); EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 
2015, supra note 5, at C2 (approximately 30% of individuals achieved a successful result in 
their deportation proceedings). 
 153. See infra Part II.B. This is not to say that the criminal justice model should be fol-
lowed blindly, as it has its own serious failings, and there are important distinctions between 
criminal and immigration pretrial detention. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: 
The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision To Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 317, 431 (1997) (warning of the danger of using comparison to propose legal reform 
given the tendency to “valorize the body of doctrine that is being deployed as the alternative 
model,” thereby obscuring problems in the model doctrine). 
 154. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-5.1 (“It should 
be presumed that defendants are entitled to release on personal recognizance . . . . This pre-
sumption may be rebutted by evidence that there is a substantial risk of nonappearance or need 
for additional conditions . . . .”); VANNOSTRAND, supra note 93, at 89 (explaining presump-
tion of release without financial requirements in the federal and most state criminal systems); 
see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 74851 (1987). 
 155. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring a hearing regard-
ing detention within forty-eight hours after arrest); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (requiring an 
adversarial court hearing to decide detention); ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra 
note 130, at Standards 10-5.9, 10-5.10. The criminal justice protections are sometimes de-
scribed as applying to decisions to detain without bond. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 75455. This 
formulation does not suggest that immigration detention comports with the criminal pretrial 
presumption against detention because of the possibility for eventual release on bond. The 
decision to detain without bond in the criminal context is the decision to detain, to be made 
after a hearing and only after consideration of all alternatives. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) 
(2012) (prohibiting bond that results in detention); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 75455; SCHNACKE, 
supra note 93, at 9 (the decision in the criminal justice system is intended as “an ‘in-or-out,’ 
‘release/detain’ decision”). In the immigration context, detention is ordered as a starting point. 
The possibility for subsequent release on bond or recognizance does not change the character 
of the detention decision, which should trigger protections against the deprivation of liberty. 
In practice, a criminal judge may also impose a bond that effectively leads to detention, and 
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focused on the threshold question of the necessity of detention before addressing 
conditions of release that might be imposed if release alone is not appropriate.156 
Even in those cases where the presence of certain factors may lead to a presumption 
of the need for detention, for example, in cases involving serious crimes in the federal 
system, detention may only be imposed in a hearing on the matter of detention before 
a judicial officer.157 The criminal justice system includes robust procedural protec-
tions for the detention hearing and decision and the opportunity for full appellate 
review.158  
The criminal justice pretrial process contrasts dramatically with the immigration 
custody determination process for release-eligible individuals in pending deportation 
proceedings. To understand the contrast fully, one might envision a proceeding in 
which a police officer orders continued detention of arrestees after apprehension, 
under a guideline that treats detention as the norm and release the exception, without 
any mandatory review by a judicial or other fully independent authority. When re-
view of the officer’s detention by a separate authority does take place, it is not auto-
matic, immediate, or scrutinizing of the original detention decision. Instead, the re-
view assumes detention is appropriate and principally considers monetary bond 
conditions on release that ensure continued detention for some period if not through-
out the proceedings. The reviewing authority is not judicial or fully independent, and 
the detainee has no opportunity for meaningful appeal beyond that review. This en-
tire process applies to those arrestees who are likely to present the least risk of flight 
or danger because they do not fall within a mandatory pretrial detention regime ap-
plicable to a broad category of individuals with existing criminal histories.  
The immigration custody determination process looks this way when put in crimi-
nal justice pretrial detention terms. The comparison between the criminal justice pre-
trial system and immigration pretrial detention reveals the extent to which the immi-
gration custody determination process fails to safeguard against unjustified pretrial 
detention of release-eligible individuals pursuant to the constitutional administrative 
detention paradigm that applies in both systems. 
                                                                                                                 
 
the protections that apply to detention decisions should then adhere there as well. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in 
the pretrial detention of the person.”); United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 109 n.5, 
109–10 (5th Cir. 1988) (when bond results in detention, guarantees of full hearing and other 
protections apply); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16 (1983) (if bond is the only available assurance 
against flight and a detainee cannot pay, then the judicial officer should hold a hearing to 
detain). 
 156. See THOMAS H. COHEN, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, NCJ-
239243, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008-2010 3 
(2012) (noting that defendants can be released or detained for additional hearings at the initial 
appearance and establishing that almost 60% of individuals charged with property and public 
order crimes were released at their initial appearance while additional individuals charged with 
these crimes were released at a subsequent pretrial hearing). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751; De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 
356 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, dissenting), 1991 WL 353522, at *8 (noting that the presumption 
in the federal criminal context is “severely restricted” in that a judicial officer must find de-
tention necessary by clear and convincing evidence, and contrasting the criminal system with 
the conclusive use of presumptions in the immigration detention context).  
 158. See generally Salerno, 481 U.S. at 74851. 
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Nor does the custody determination process provide the type of individualized 
determination and review of immigration detention that international human rights 
standards require. International human rights law demands that each decision to de-
tain a migrant must involve a determination regarding necessity with the burden on 
the government to justify the need in a specific case.159 Presumptive or automatic 
detention is expressly prohibited.160 The standards also require “automatic” and 
“regular” “review of detention” by independent judicial authorities.161 The immigra-
tion custody determination process does not meet these requirements for adequate 
protection of liberty. Given the parallels between human rights law and U.S. consti-
tutional principles in this area, the failure of the immigration custody determination 
process to conform to human rights standards constitutes further evidence of the sys-
tem’s failure to hew to constitutional norms. 
At its essence, the custody determination process for release-eligible migrants in 
immigration court deportation proceedings does not differ greatly in kind from the 
mandatory detention regime that has been heavily critiqued.162 Both provide for au-
tomatic detention decisions leading to deprivation of liberty, without a previous in-
dividualized determination of the necessity of detention to address flight risk or dan-
ger to the community. Neither provide for review of the central decision to detain.  
This is not to say that the two categories of detention are identical or even that 
mandatory detention is not worse in terms of liberty deprivation. The custody deter-
mination process for release-eligible individuals at least offers the potential for re-
lease during pending immigration court deportation proceedings, after the initial de-
tention decision and some period of detention. Mandatory detention generally does 
not offer that possibility. However, recognition of the basic nature of detention as 
the nonindividualized and automatic norm, in both categories, is important. It reveals 
that the custody determination process for release-eligible individuals does not rep-
resent the opposite pole of the detention spectrum from mandatory detention.163 As 
a result, the custody determination process should be viewed as part of the problem 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 2, ¶¶ 35, 37, 39, 134; UNHCR DETENTION 
GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 18–19, 47(v) (providing that decisions to detain must be 
based on a “detailed and individualised assessment” with the burden on detaining authorities); 
see also Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, at ¶¶ 9.2, 9.4 (April 3, 1997) (holding that grounds for detention 
must be “particular to . . . individual[s]”). 
 160. UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at ¶ 20 (prohibiting automatic de-
tention as arbitrary); IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 34, 428 (establishing 
presumption against detention and disapproving “mandatory detention for broad classes of 
immigrants”); Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, ¶ 118 (Nov. 23, 2010) (finding a violation of liberty in 
automatic detention of migrants without individualized consideration). 
 161. UNHCR DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at ¶ 47(iv) (requiring “regular peri-
odic reviews of the necessity for the continuation of detention”); Human Rights Comm., A v. 
Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, ¶ 9.4 (requiring periodic review of justification for 
detention); Velez Loor v. Panama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (No. 218), ¶¶ 107, 126 (requir-
ing judicial review of immigration detention). 
 162. See supra notes 11, 67 and accompanying text. 
 163. See, e.g., Kalhan, supra note 10, at 45, 48, 54 (favorably contrasting bond hearings 
with mandatory detention schemes and recommending greater availability of bond hearings). 
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with unjustified liberty deprivation in the context of civil detention for immigration 
reasons, rather than as the solution to the concerns raised by mandatory detention. 
Many of the critiques of mandatory detention should be extended to detention of 
release-eligible individuals and thus to the entire pretrial immigration detention sys-
tem. In turn, this recognition sounds a note of caution regarding the vulnerability of 
the limits on nonpunitive administrative detention more generally, including in the 
pretrial criminal detention context. 
Careful inquiry must then take place into the main difference that does exist be-
tween migrants subject to mandatory detention and release-eligible migrantsthe 
potential for achieving freedom after a period of detention, during the ongoing im-
migration court deportation proceedings. The inquiry reveals that release after initial 
detention is not easily obtained.  
B. Selective Borrowing from the Criminal Justice System with Negative 
Consequences for Liberty 
In determining the possibility for release, usually on condition of payment of a 
monetary bond, the immigration custody determination process borrows heavily 
from criminal pretrial systems but ignores the evolution of criminal justice principles 
towards greater liberty protection. This phenomenon is a variation on the recognized 
problem of asymmetric incorporation of elements of the criminal justice system into 
the immigration setting without adoption of the procedural guarantees available to 
criminal defendants.164 Here, the immigration system has adopted from criminal jus-
tice pretrial detention models selectively, incorporating certain aspects of criminal 
pretrial detention without studying the lessons learned in the criminal context.  
As a result, from a liberty perspective, immigration detention has taken much of 
the bad but not the good from the criminal pretrial justice system. The selective bor-
rowing has led to the buildup of a system under which migrants regularly remain 
detained for lengthy periods after the original detention decision and often through-
out their immigration court deportation proceedings. Freedom continues to be out of 
reach even where it has not been established that detention is necessary to prevent 
flight or danger to the community. 
1. Emphasis on Monetary Bonds 
With detention as the automatic starting point, the immigration custody determin-
ation process focuses at all stages on setting monetary bond amounts as a condition 
of release. It is for this reason that the immigration custody determination process is 
often referred to under the moniker of “bond hearings” or “seeking bond.”  
The emphasis on monetary bond severely limits the ability for release, as de-
scribed above. Despite its impact on liberty, though, bond remains the central 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 47273 (2007); see generally Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367 (2006) (laying out theory that only the harshest and most exclusionary portions of 
criminal law make their way into the immigration law framework). 
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consideration. As noted previously, release on recognizance is rare.165 In addition, 
conditions for release other than monetary bond are not systematically considered.  
In its initial custody determination, DHS may consider release on the condition 
of enrollment in a formal alternative-to-detention program.166 However, these pro-
grams consist mostly of electronic ankle monitoring and other reporting require-
ments administered by private contractors.167 The programs thus raise their own lib-
erty questions and also have geographical and capacity limitations.168 The 
effectiveness of these programs has not been established.169 
There is no system for DHS to assess the needs of a migrant, such as lack of 
housing or legal counsel, and to offer assistance that would address those specific 
concerns that make it less likely that a migrant will appear for hearings without 
detention.170 Use of alternative conditions that would allow for immediate release, in 
place of a bond requirement, is therefore uncommon.171  
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See supra notes 26–28, 95 and accompanying text. 
 166. RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 4. 
 167. See GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 9−10; The GEO Group 
Awarded Contract by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for the Continued 
Provision of Services Under Intensive Supervision and Appearance Program, BUS. WIRE 
(Sept. 10, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140910005643/en 
/GEO-Group-Awarded-Contract-U.S.-Immigration-Customs [https://perma.cc/VKW4-9CZ2] 
(noting that private corrections company GEO has secured the contract for the supervision 
program that forms the “core component of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Alternatives to Detention program”). 
 168. See 2015 ICE BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 105, at 60−63 (pages 1308–11 of full 
document) (noting limit on availability of formal alternatives-to-detention spots and difficul-
ties in expansion because of resource constraints); LESLIE E. VÉLEZ & MEGAN BREMER, 
LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVS., UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A WAY FORWARD FOR 
U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY 31–32 (2011) (reporting resource constraints on insti-
tutional alternatives-to-detention programs, such as the fact that certain programs exist only 
within a certain radius from a limited number of designated ICE offices). 
 169. See GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 31−36; OIG REPORT ON 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 92, at 8. 
 170. See Megan Bremer, Kimberly Haynes, Nicholas Kang, Michael D. Lynch & Kerri 
Socha, New Models for Alternatives to Detention in the US, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Sept. 
2013, at 50–51 (urging use of such evaluation and support programs). But cf. U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: STAKEHOLDER 
REFERRALS TO THE ICE/ERO FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (2016), http://www.ilw.com 
/immigrationdaily/news/2016,0111-ICE.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8BR-5YF3] (announcing a 
small, geographically-limited program for case management services run by a for-profit 
company). 
 171. See GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 8 (showing that, in 2013, 
migrants were released pretrial through alternatives-to-detention programs with almost half 
the frequency that they were released after payment of a monetary bond). DHS has recently 
dramatically increased the use of electronic ankle monitoring upon release of women and chil-
dren who were apprehended together at the border. See E.C. Gogolak, Ankle Monitors Weigh 
on Immigrant Mothers Released from Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/nyregion/ankle-monitors-weigh-on-immigrant-mothers 
-released-from-detention.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/75E3-YFW7]. However, this trend 
should not be seen as a diminution in the use of detention and monetary bond. The practice 
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Similarly, in custody redetermination hearings in immigration court, the judges 
do not consider possibilities for release other than release on bond, or on recogni-
zance or conditional parole in rare cases. The applicable regulations do not give the 
immigration courts clear authority to order release from detention upon conditions 
other than bond, such as electronic monitoring or registration for services.172 In any 
case, structural arrangements do not exist that would allow the immigration courts to 
condition release on enrollment in a formal alternative-to-detention program. DHS 
controls entry into alternative-to-detention supervision and other programs.173 The 
immigration courts cannot usually require ICE to make a particular program availa-
ble to a migrant as a condition for release from detention. Bonds thus remain the 
focal point of the immigration court custody redetermination hearings. 
The concept of pretrial detention with bond as the primary condition for potential 
release is patterned on the tradition of the criminal justice system.174 However, the 
immigration system has not followed more recent developments in the criminal 
pretrial justice system that move away from the use of monetary bond. The particular 
emphasis on monetary bond in the immigration detention context has taken place 
relatively recently, after monetary bonds had already been discredited in the criminal 
pretrial justice system.175 
                                                                                                                 
 
has largely applied to a specific group of women and children. Also, given that the electronic 
monitors are not imposed after any individual finding of flight risk or danger that they are 
calibrated to ameliorate, the monitors should be seen as an alternative form of deprivation of 
liberty rather than a mechanism for release on conditions that address established flight risk 
or danger through means other than requirement of a monetary bond.  
 172. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2016) (allowing immigration court review only to decide 
detention, release, or release on bond); cf. Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(ordering immigration courts to order placement in alternatives-to-detention programs where 
appropriate); ACLU OF S. CAL., RESTORING DUE PROCESS, supra note 138, at 4 (explaining 
that for a specific set of cases in which a federal court ordered the immigration courts to con-
sider alternatives to detention, release on alternatives-to-detention alone (without payment of 
bond) occurred in fewer than 1% of cases). Immigration courts can generally review condi-
tions imposed by DHS, such as imposition of an electronic monitoring device, but cannot 
readily impose conditions on their own. Garcia-Garcia, 25 I. & N. Dec. 93, 96, 98 (B.I.A. 
2009), 2009 WL 3309140, at *3, 5. 
 173. See GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 8–9, 9 n.21 (noting that 
ICE manages alternatives-to-detention programs and places migrants into the programs while 
the immigration courts are only authorized to place migrants into the programs in “limited 
circumstances relating to ongoing class action litigation”); VÉLEZ & BREMER, supra note 168, 
at 29–34 (describing the functioning of alternatives-to-detention programs and the manner in 
which DHS refers migrants into the programs). 
 174. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (justifying detention for 
immigration purposes on the grounds that “[d]etention is a usual feature of every case of arrest 
on a criminal charge”); SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 29 (dating the widespread use of money 
bond in criminal pretrial proceedings to 100 years ago); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1372−79 (2014) (tracing ex-
pansion of immigration detention to increasing connection between immigration and criminal 
law); Legomsky, supra note 164, at 489−94 (treating expanded preventive detention in the 
immigration context as incorporation of criminal norms). 
 175. Compare Drysdale, 20 I. &. N Dec. 815, 817 (B.I.A. 1994), 1994 WL 232084, at *2 
(“Once it is determined that an alien does not present a danger to the community or any bail 
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The focus on monetary bonds as the central issue in the custody determination 
process, and the only real mechanism for securing release after a detention decision, 
demonstrates the error of adopting the criminal justice model without due attention 
to criminal justice developments. In the criminal justice context in which monetary 
bonds arose, there has been significant research that demonstrates the inefficiency of 
using financial bonds to prevent flight risk or danger as well as the inherent unfair-
ness of relying on monetary guarantees as a primary condition for release from detention.  
In the criminal justice context, studies over several decades have shown that im-
position of a monetary bond is not an effective way to minimize the risk of flight or 
danger to the community. Research and analysis establishes that monetary bond is 
not effective at preventing danger to the community by deterring criminal activity.176 
As to addressing flight risk, the research has not shown that monetary requirements 
are effective, because it is not at all clear that money motivates appearance in 
court.177 In fact, even short periods of detention, such as those that may result from 
the need to gather a bond sum before securing release, have been shown to have 
negative effects on compliance with ongoing proceedings after release.178 In addi-
tion, bond is a very dull instrument for managing flight risk when compared to tools 
that allow decision makers to target nonmonetary conditions of release towards spe-
cific risk factors presented by individuals who may evade proceedings if released 
without conditions.179 
In addition, the criminal pretrial justice research confirms that a system revolving 
around monetary bonds results in greater likelihood of detention for indigent 
                                                                                                                 
 
risk, then no bond should be required.”), and Sanders, supra note 12, at 143, 146 (finding in 
1993 that release without a bond requirement was allowed in almost 70% of cases in a sample, 
while bond was required in fewer than 25% of cases in the sample), and GAO, ALTERNATIVES 
TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 8 (noting that release after payment of a bond was the most 
common mechanism for leaving ICE detention in 2013), with PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
MISCONDUCT, supra note 156, at 2 (noting that financial bonds were used almost exclusively 
in the federal criminal system at one time but only up until 1966), and SCHNACKE, supra note 
14, at 36–40 (noting efforts to diminish the role of monetary bond dating back to the period 
between the 1920s and 1960s and noting that intensive reform of bond practices in the pretrial 
criminal justice context dates to the 1990s). 
 176. See generally Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 1 (2008). 
 177. See SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 13; SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 32 (“[E]xpecting 
money to effectively mitigate risk . . . is historically unfounded.”). 
 178. SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 16–17 (noting that “even small amounts of pre-trial de-
tention—perhaps even the few days necessary to secure funds to pay a cash bond . . .—have 
negative effects” and create greater risk of failure to appear or danger); SCHNACKE, supra note 
93, at 49 (in the criminal pretrial context, even “short periods” of detention correlate with 
negative outcomes in terms of pretrial compliance and outcomes on the merits). 
 179. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 4, 21 (explaining that monetary bail has 
not been empirically shown to correlate with appearance rates and is an inefficient tool); 
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 
134749 (2014) (noting inefficiency of monetary bond system in securing appearance in the 
criminal justice context and advancements in other means of addressing flight risk). See 
generally RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); 
SCHNACKE, supra note 93. 
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individuals and less detention for the affluent, regardless of actual flight risk or 
danger to the community.180 This problematic effect of reliance on monetary bonds 
is magnified because detention tends to correlate with negative results in final 
outcomes (higher rates of conviction and longer sentences, in the criminal 
context).181 Perhaps even more worrisome, the evidence suggests that financially-
based pretrial detention systems have a disparate negative impact on minorities.182 
As a result, by the 1960s, there was broad acknowledgment by experts that the 
criminal justice system needed to move away from financial bonds.183 A presumption 
of liberty was reaffirmed and the focus shifted to rigorous pretrial screening pro-
grams designed to identify for attention those individuals presenting a true flight risk 
or danger.184 The screening is intended to allow for release wherever possible, even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1 
(2007) (finding many criminal defendants were detained pretrial because of inability to meet 
the financial conditions required for release); JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 4, 14 
(“those too poor to pay a money bail remain in jail regardless of their risk level”); 
PARTNERSHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, CAL. FORWARD, PRETRIAL DETENTION & COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION: BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 12 (Sharon Aungst 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BEST PRACTICES] (“[T]here is no research to support . . . a 
tie [between bond and flight risk] since the ability to pay a bond is more closely linked to 
economic circumstances than to risk.”); ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT 
ADM’RS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE 4 (2013) (“Many of those incarcerated pretrial 
do not present a substantial risk of failure to appear or a threat to public safety, but do lack the 
financial means to be released.”); John Clark, The Impact of Money Bail on Jail Bed Usage, 
AM. JAILS, July/Aug. 2010, at 47, 50 (citing several commentaries concluding that the use of 
monetary bond does not serve legitimate goals of protecting public safety and instead ensures 
that the poorest defendants will remain in detention while those with resources will be re-
leased); Wiseman, supra note 179, at 1359–61 (describing “wealth discrimination” resulting 
from the use of monetary conditions on release and also analyzing the ineffectiveness of mone-
tary bonds in incentivizing appearance in court).  
 181. See JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND 
DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1979); JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 13; PEPIN, 
supra note 180, at 5. 
 182. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 1516; PEPIN, supra note 180, at 45. 
 183. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3152) (creating a presumption of pretrial release and making financial 
conditions a last resort in terms of conditions to be imposed); ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE 
STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10.5.3 (providing that financial conditions are to be 
imposed only when no other less restrictive condition of release will ensure appearance at 
proceedings). The ABA Pretrial Release Standards that lay out much of this framework are 
not legally binding but enjoy great respect and are regularly cited by policymakers and courts 
as laying out a model for decision making. See, e.g., SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 96 (citing 
the standards); PEPIN, supra note 180, at 10 (same). 
 184. E.g., ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-1.5 (en-
couraging development of drug, mental health, and other alternatives to detention as well as 
new approaches to monitoring defendants); id. at Standard 10-1.10 (establishing importance 
of development of a pretrial services agency to conduct risk assessments and provide services 
and monitoring to individuals on pretrial release); id. at Standard 10-4.2 (setting out im-
portance of assessing objective criteria in determining flight risk or danger and considering 
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where some risk of flight or danger exists, through development of a range of alter-
natives to detention that address any risk factors arising in individual cases without 
conditioning release on payment of a monetary bond. These alternatives include edu-
cational and other support components as well as monitoring elements.185 The system 
does foresee detention in some instances, as a last resort to be used upon a determi-
nation of high risk that cannot be addressed other than by detention.186 However, under this 
framework, detention should not result by default from a monetary bond requirement.187 
To be clear, not all criminal jurisdictions have embraced this change in focus 
away from pretrial detention with a monetary bond system, and money bonds still 
play a problematic role in the criminal justice system.188 But there is certainly move-
ment away from the use of monetary bond. Courts, policymakers, and advocates en-
joy broad awareness of the desirability of aligning the system with the available re-
search establishing the benefits of such change.189 For example, the District of 
Columbia has virtually eliminated the use of money bond as a condition of release 
from pretrial criminal detention. Instead, the District of Columbia has supported a 
strong Pretrial Services Agency that engages in active supervision of released 
defendants and provides a range of support services to them.190 In doing so, it has 
documented remarkably low absconding rates and rates of new violent crimes by 
those released.191 
                                                                                                                 
 
possibility for enrollment in release programs); JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 3234; 
PEPIN, supra note 180, at 2, 69. 
 185. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 3234; Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, 
Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 73 FED. PROB. 3, 7 (2009); CALIFORNIA BEST 
PRACTICES, supra note 180, at 9; Wiseman, supra note 179, at 1363. 
 186. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-1.6.  
 187. Id. at Standard 10-5.3.  
 188. See, e.g., LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR 
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2 (2013) (finding that less than 10% of U.S. jurisdictions use data-
driven pretrial risk assessments, and those jurisdictions that do so have limited pretrial deten-
tion at significant cost savings); SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 10 (laying out “negative out-
comes” of the monetary bail system, including pretrial detention at a rate that is “three times 
the world average”); Wiseman, supra note 179, at 1349 (noting that reform diminishing the 
importance of monetary bonds has struggled against “the will of the commercial bail 
industry”). 
 189. See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, THE TRUTH ABOUT COMMERCIAL 
BAIL BONDING IN AMERICA 4 (2009) (noting that some states have prohibited commercial bond 
systems); PEPIN, supra note 180, at 1011 (identifying jurisdictions that have made changes 
while acknowledging resistance to change, particularly given commercial interests in the cur-
rent system); SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 8082 (noting trend towards changes in laws and 
policies and listing organizations that have advocated for improvements in the process for 
determining pretrial custody). 
 190. See SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 60; see also PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY OF D.C., 
http://www.psa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/S5TP-BPG4]. 
 191. SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 57 & n.138 (commenting on the “virtually moneyless 
administration of bail performed each day in the District of Columbia” and citing statistics 
that show that 89% of released defendants appeared for all court dates and only 1% committed 
a violent crime). 
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However, it is as if news of these developments has not even reached the immi-
gration detention system, although many of the same problems with monetary bond 
identified in the criminal pretrial system apply in immigration cases. As with crimi-
nal pretrial detention, there is a similar likelihood that indigent migrants will remain 
detained for most or all of their immigration court deportation proceedings, because 
of inability to pay a financial bond, without regard for their actual flight risk or 
danger to the community.192 The racial impacts of the reliance on money bonds have 
not been studied in the immigration context but may well be significant.193  
In addition, detention during immigration proceedings has a strong negative im-
pact on final outcomes in immigration proceedings. Detained individuals are much 
less likely to succeed in their immigration court cases and avoid deportation than are 
those not in detention.194 That impact is likely even greater in the immigration con-
text than in the criminal context, because migrants are not entitled to appointed coun-
sel. Migrants face even greater difficulties in obtaining legal representation if de-
tained, and representation is a key factor in achieving successful outcomes in the 
underlying immigration court case.195 Perhaps even worse, some migrants give up 
viable claims to immigration status and relief from deportation rather than remain in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 6 (including examples of individuals who remained 
in detention throughout immigration court deportation proceedings because of inability to pay 
bond); INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 95, at 11 (explaining that 55% of migrants for 
whom a bond is set do not obtain release because of inability to pay the bond amount); Eagly 
& Shafer, supra note 6, at 69 n.220 (noting that many immigrants are not able to afford high 
bonds). 
 193. See Sanders, supra note 12, at 158 (reviewing small sample custody determination set 
from 1993 and concluding tentatively that “Anglos did tend to receive lower bonds than 
Hispanics, and Blacks”). Individuals placed in deportation proceedings are disproportionately 
Latin American, so bond practices have a greater negative impact on these minorities, particu-
larly because they also tend to have lower income levels. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN 
RIGHTS INST. & NE. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW PROGRAM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOB. ECON., 
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES, 
INCLUDING IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 56 (2014) (finding that “Latin American immigrants 
are disproportionately targeted for removal proceedings” and are “more likely to be poor”); 
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 112115 
(2013) (finding that the “Secure Communities” immigration enforcement program focused on 
heavily Hispanic communities). 
 194. Peter L. Markowitz, Jojo Annobil, Stacy Caplow, Peter v.Z. Cobb, Nancy Morawetz, 
Oren Root, Claudia Slovinsky, Zhifen Cheng, & Lindsay C. Nash, Accessing Justice: The 
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 
363–64 (2011) (finding that only 3% of unrepresented detained individuals have a successful 
outcome); see also Representation Is Key in Immigration Proceedings Involving Women with 
Children, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Feb. 18, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/377 
[https://perma.cc/D26A-RNHV] (establishing difficulty of detained families in obtaining rep-
resentation and showing that “a critical factor influencing outcome is whether the immigrant 
is represented”). 
 195. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 6, at 32 (finding that detained migrants are five times less 
likely to obtain counsel than nondetained individuals); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal 
Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55–56 (2008) (pointing out that detainees are more limited in obtaining 
representation, which is the “single most important non-merit factor” determining outcomes). 
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detention to await the outcome of immigration court proceedings.196 These decisions 
result in deportation of individuals who may face danger or other significant harms 
in their home countries, as a result of detention rather than the legal standards that 
should determine eligibility to remain in the United States.  
Furthermore, there has been no research establishing that monetary bonds are ef-
fective in addressing risks of flight or danger presented by migrants in immigration 
court deportation proceedings.197 Many migrants do not even understand that bond 
money is intended to assure appearance and will be returned if there is compliance 
with that obligation.198 Bond is thus unlikely to serve as an incentive. The arbitrary 
nature of the immigration bond-setting process, as described below, makes it particu-
larly unsuited to incentivizing behavior to address any actual risk of flight or 
danger.199  
As in the criminal justice system, the use of bond may actually create greater risk 
of nonappearance. Detention for even some period, often while waiting to pay or 
seek a reduction in bond, appears to be correlated with somewhat lower appearance 
rates after release.200  
The immigration system has nonetheless adhered to the focus on monetary bonds 
despite the lessons learned from the criminal justice system about the inadvisability 
of allowing money to dictate pretrial detention. As a result, all too often the initial 
decision to detain is followed by lengthy additional detention, because the imposition 
of bond impedes release without regard to flight risk or danger. Liberty is thus com-
promised. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. See Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Salinas-Mendoza, No. A202-079-353 (B.I.A. June 
14, 2016) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (explaining decision to withdraw BIA appeal, 
despite fear of return to home country, because of detention); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra 
note 6, at 2021 (providing example of asylum seekers who withdrew their claims in order to 
achieve release).  
 197. See GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, at 33, 33 n.66 (acknowledg-
ing that ICE does not maintain full data regarding migrants released after paying bond, much 
less particular bond amounts, which might allow analysis of effectiveness in improving ap-
pearance rates or other compliance); Das, supra note 9, at 152 (noting that available data does 
not establish nonappearance rates as a function of bond release characteristics). 
 198. See Emily Ryo & Caitlin Patler, Bonding Out: Judicial Decision-Making in 
Immigration Bond Hearings 28 (Oct. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript on file with Indiana 
Law Journal) (noting that unrepresented migrants expressed confusion about the purpose of 
custody redetermination hearings); FLORENCE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT, 
ALL ABOUT BONDS 2 (2011), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads 
/5%20-%20Bond%20Packet_English_LOP%20CD.pdf [https://perma.cc/C42E-K8UJ] (provid-
ing explanation to immigration detainees that a bond “is not a fine” and will be repaid if the 
detainee appears for hearings after release, in reflection of the common confusion among 
immigration detainees about bonds). 
 199. See Part II.B.2.b. 
 200. EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015, supra note 5, at P2P3 (explaining that for fiscal 
years 20112014, in absentia decision rates as a percentage of total decisions for individuals 
detained and then released are higher than those never detained). 
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2. The Problematic Use of Criminal Justice Pretrial Considerations  
Selective adoption of elements from the criminal pretrial context with problematic 
results extends further in the immigration custody determination process, however. 
In setting bond, the immigration authorities use factors copied from pretrial risk de-
termination in the criminal justice system, again without adoption of important con-
siderations that have developed alongside these factors in the criminal context.201  
The degree of adoption of criminal elements into the immigration system is 
evident from Table 1 below. The factors used to set bond in immigration custody 
proceedings are shown in the first column.202 Set out alongside these factors, in the 
second and third columns, are the factors considered in the pretrial criminal justice 
setting to assign a risk level for the purpose of determining whether release is possi-
ble or whether pretrial detention is necessary.203 Where release is possible, these fac-
tors may also be used for the purpose of imposing conditions to control specific iden-
tified risk concerns, after release. The factors in all three columns largely mirror one 
another. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. E.g., San Martin, 15 I. & N. Dec. 167, 168 (B.I.A. 1974), 1974 WL 30025 *2 (explic-
itly incorporating factors from the pretrial justice system, specifically the Bail Reform Act, 
into the immigration custody determination process).  
 202. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627 *3 (setting out 
the factors). The specific factors considered by DHS in assessing bond at the initial custody 
determination stage, through use of the risk classification assessment tool or otherwise, are 
not readily available but appear to track the BIA factors. See RISK CLASSIFICATION 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 4 (listing factors for ICE to consider in determining custody); 
Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 5968 (identifying factors considered by the risk classi-
fication assessment tool which mirror factors identified in Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37). 
 203. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012) (listing factors for consideration in deciding pretrial 
release or detention in the federal criminal justice system); ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE 
STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-5.1 (listing standards for determining when re-
lease is possible and for conditions on release that address risk factors); see also N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2016) (setting out similar factors for New York 
pretrial system). 
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Table 1. Adoption of Criminal Elements into Immigration System 
Matter of Guerra (BIA 2006);204 
Matter of X-K- (BIA 2005);205 
Matter of Andrade (BIA 1987)206 
Bail Reform Act (1984);207 
United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987)208 
ABA Pretrial Release 
Standards (2002)209 
Length of residence in the 
United States 
Length of residence in 
community 
Length of residence in 
community 
Employment history in the 
United States, including length 
and stability 
Employment Employment status and 
history 
Family ties in the United States 
(and whether ties may lead to 
status) 
Family ties; community 
ties 
Family ties; 
community ties 
Record of appearance in court Record concerning 
appearance at court 
proceedings 
Record concerning 
appearance at court 
proceedings 
Criminal record, including 
extensiveness, recency, and 
seriousness 
Nature and circumstances 
of offense charged; 
whether at time of arrest 
on probation or parole 
Nature and 
circumstances of 
offense charged; 
criminal history; 
whether at time of 
arrest on probation or 
parole 
History of immigration 
violations 
Past conduct Past conduct 
Attempts to flee prosecution or 
otherwise escape authorities 
Record concerning 
appearance at court 
proceedings 
Record of appearance 
at court proceedings 
Manner of entry into the United 
States 
— — 
Fixed address — — 
Possibility of success on the 
merits of application for relief 
Weight of evidence 
against the person 
Weight of the evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40, 2006 WL 3337627, at *3.  
 205. X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005), 2005 WL 1104422.  
 206. Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 489–90 (B.I.A. 1987), 1987 WL 108952, at *2.  
 207. Bail Reform Act of 1984, ch. I, sec. 203, § 3142(g), 98 Stat. 1976, 1980 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142).  
 208. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  
 209. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standards 10-5.1, 10-5.8.  
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Matter of Guerra (BIA 2006);204 
Matter of X-K- (BIA 2005);205 
Matter of Andrade (BIA 1987)206 
Bail Reform Act (1984);207 
United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987)208 
ABA Pretrial Release 
Standards (2002)209 
Character Person’s character, 
physical and mental 
condition; history relating 
to drug or alcohol abuse 
Person’s character, 
physical and mental 
condition; history 
relating to drug or 
alcohol abuse 
— Financial resources Financial resources 
Migrants who present a danger 
to persons or property should not 
be released 
Nature and seriousness of 
the danger posed by the 
person’s release 
Availability of persons 
who agree to assist the 
defendant; concerns 
about possible 
violation of law if 
released  
This adoption of factors from the criminal justice system in setting bonds raises sev-
eral difficulties that reflect the failure of the immigration detention system to learn 
from the criminal justice system, even while mimicking it. First, the most important 
lesson learned in the criminal justice system is that significant empirical study is 
required in order to determine what factors predict risk sufficiently that they may be 
relied upon in making pretrial decisions. Yet, no such study supports the use of fac-
tors from the criminal justice system in the immigration context. Second, the immi-
gration detention system adopts the criminal pretrial factors without imitating their 
use in the criminal justice system. In the criminal system, they are used to determine 
whether release is possible and, if so, to determine what types of support programs 
or requirements should be imposed after release; in the immigration system, the fac-
tors are used to set bond amounts, which in turn limits to varying degrees the possi-
bility for eventual release even where release has been deemed viable enough for a 
bond to be set. As a result of the noncontextual adoption of the criminal justice pre-
trial factors, the factors have little value in the immigration pretrial detention context. 
They do not delimit the decision-making process to prevent arbitrary bond setting 
and unnecessary detention. 
a. Borrowing Without Consideration of Applicability 
In the criminal justice system, numerous empirical studies have been conducted 
over a period of decades to identify the factors that are predictive of a criminal de-
fendant’s likelihood of flight or risk to the community.210 As a result of this in-depth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. See, e.g., STEVEN JAY CUVELIER & DENNIS W. POTTS, STATE JUSTICE INST., BAIL 
CLASSIFICATION PROFILE PROJECT: HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS (1993); Shima Baradaran & Frank 
L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 513–24 (2012) (describing previous 
studies and the current dataset used in an empirical study of predictors of pretrial risk of dan-
ger); Stevens H. Clarke, Jean L. Freeman & Gary G. Koch, Bail Risk: A Multivariate Analysis, 
5 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (1976); Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration 
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analysis, tools for risk assessment have been developed in order to take into account 
the most significant considerations in determining risk of flight or danger. These 
tools are subject to continued revision and development based on the research. They 
provide evidence-based guides for pretrial decisions.211  
Information is broadly available about these empirically determined factors in the 
criminal pretrial justice system and the benefits of relying on them in making effec-
tive decisions regarding detention or release and imposing pretrial conditions.212 
Criminal jurisdictions are encouraged to hew ever more closely to these relevant fac-
tors in making pretrial detention or release determinations.213 As with the move away 
from monetary bonds, the transition to an evidence-based risk assessment approach 
to pretrial decision making has not always been smooth. However, there is broad 
consensus among standard bearers in the criminal justice world that the change 
should occur.214  
While borrowing specific pretrial factors from the criminal justice system, the 
immigration pretrial custody determination system has not followed the broader 
trend in criminal justice of emphasizing empirical study as a means of identifying 
relevant factors that will effectively aid decision making. No empirical research has 
taken place to identify factors that accurately predict the risk of flight or danger pre-
sented by a migrant in deportation proceedings.215  
Nor can it simply be assumed that the factors that have been deemed reliable in 
the criminal context may also be utilized effectively in the immigration setting. In 
the criminal pretrial justice system, experts recommend that empirical analysis be 
conducted by each jurisdiction to ensure the predictive validity of specific factors to 
be used for pretrial decisions.216 If the same factors cannot be assumed to apply in 
different jurisdictions in the criminal justice context, the immigration system cer-
tainly requires a separate analysis of relevant factors from that conducted in the 
criminal justice setting. 
At the broadest level, the purposes and characteristics of the criminal and immi-
gration systems are sufficiently distinct to cause pause in the deployment of similar 
pretrial decision-making criteria in each. In the criminal justice system, the most 
                                                                                                                 
 
of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034–36 (1954); VanNostrand & Keebler, 
supra note 185. 
 211. See, e.g., PEPIN, supra note 180, at 7; VANNOSTRAND, supra note 93, at 11–12; Kristin 
Bechtel, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Alex Holsinger, Identifying the Predictors of Pretrial 
Failure: A Meta-Analysis, 75 FED. PROB. 78, 78 (2011). 
 212. See, e.g., PEPIN, supra note 180, at 7; MARIE VANNOSTRAND, KENNETH J. ROSE, 
KIMBERLY WEIBRECHT, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUPERVISION (2011); Bechtel et al., supra note 211. 
 213. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 180, at 913; PEPIN, supra note 
180, at 79. 
 214. See, e.g., ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-1.10; 
SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 8890. 
 215. OIG REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 92, at 12 (noting a failure 
to assess the predictive capabilities of the ICE risk classification assessment tool by gathering 
critical outcomes information); see also GAO, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, supra note 95, 
at 33 n.66 (acknowledging that ICE officials do not track basic data on those individuals who 
are released from detention or their compliance rates). 
 216. See Bechtel et al., supra note 211, at 1; VANNOSTRAND, supra note 93, at 14.  
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favorable result that can be obtained is a finding of no guilt, whereas in the 
immigration system an individual might not only avoid deportation but also gain 
status in the United States after attending hearings in immigration court.217 The 
incentives to appear at hearings are potentially very different and must be analyzed 
before the immigration system adopts the factors utilized to determine pretrial 
detention of criminal defendants.  
For example, prior criminal history may predict the likelihood that an individual 
will appear in new criminal proceedings,218 perhaps because the criminal history re-
lates to the individual’s prior positive or negative experiences with the criminal jus-
tice system in ways that might impact future willingness to participate. However, 
immigration court deportation proceedings are civil, are adjudicated apart from 
criminal matters, and do not involve a potential criminal sanction. The criminal and 
immigration processes are so distinct that an individual’s relation to the criminal 
process does not necessarily predict a relationship to immigration court deportation 
proceedings.219  
Similarly, the predictive power of family or community ties220 may be weak for 
certain migrants in pending immigration court deportation proceedings.221 Recently 
arriving asylum seekers may have few or no existing ties in this country but may 
have every incentive to appear for hearings in order to seek refugee status and avoid 
deportation to a country where they may face physical harm or death.222 On the other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. But see Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 671–72 (1997) (suggesting that criminal defendants may have more incen-
tives to appear than migrants in deportation proceedings). 
 218. See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 93, at 14 (listing criminal history as a tested 
predictor of court appearance and/or danger to the community). 
 219. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 79–80 (noting that factors relating to criminal 
history “operate differently” in risk assessment in the immigration context, focusing on the 
likelihood that criminal history will be more recent in the criminal justice context) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 220. Although family ties and community ties are generally well accepted as valid 
considerations in the criminal setting, their predictive nature has been questioned even in the 
criminal pretrial context based on empirical study. See, e.g., Bechtel et al., supra note 211, 
at 8081. 
 221. Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 79 (suggesting that some individuals “may under-
report family ties in an ICE interview for fear of relatives’ deportation, a concern less present 
in criminal justice”). In their article assessing the effectiveness of ICE’s risk classification 
assessment tool, Noferi and Koulish note similar problems with utilizing pretrial risk factors 
from the criminal justice system to make detention decisions in the immigration context and 
provide additional examples of the mismatch between immigration and criminal pretrial de-
tention decision making, relating to employment history and other factors. Noferi & Koulish, 
supra note 13, at 78–81. 
 222. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 208, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012)) (setting out the asylum process); see also CATHRYN 
COSTELLO & ESRA KAYTAZ, DIV. OF INT’L PROTECTION, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES, BUILDING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: PERCEPTIONS 
OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN TORONTO AND GENEVA 78 (2013) (highlighting re-
search demonstrating that asylum seekers are likely to appear for immigration court deporta-
tion proceedings). 
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hand, some asylum seekers may face such a serious threat in their home country that 
they may fear appearing for immigration court hearings and running the risk of fac-
ing deportation, particularly if they have had negative interactions with the immigra-
tion system such that they do not trust its reliability in protecting them. Even if they 
have family members in the United States, they may have a strong incentive to avoid 
hearings and any other contact with immigration officials in order to minimize the 
possibility of returning to a dangerous situation. Despite these considerations, the 
factors of community and family ties are weighted heavily in the immigration custody 
determination process, 223 having been copied years ago from the criminal justice system.  
There are other institutional differences that make it unwise to import the factors 
used in criminal pretrial detention proceedings into the immigration custody deter-
mination process. In the criminal context, a criminal defendant will generally be ap-
pointed counsel if unable to afford a private attorney.224 This right does not apply to 
migrants in deportation proceedings in the immigration courts under current inter-
pretation of the law.225 Migrants who are represented by counsel are more likely to 
attend their hearings, though.226 Migrants represented by counsel are significantly 
more likely to be successful in their immigration cases, thus incentivizing 
appearance.227 Immigration attorneys are also in a position to explain the proceedings 
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *3. 
 224. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2012); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661–62 (2002) 
(reaffirming general rule of right to appointed counsel while recognizing exceptions); Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 34245 (1963). Criminal defendants are not necessarily entitled 
to counsel at the proceeding that determines detention. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 
U.S. 191, 21318 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring); Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and 
the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2013). But here, I am 
discussing the effect of counsel in improving appearance at the merits stage.  
 225. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). But cf. J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 
2015) (No. C14-1026 TSZ), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, Nos. 15-35738 & 
15-35739, 2016 WL 5030344 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2016) (litigation regarding the appointment 
of counsel for certain minors); Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 
2013 WL 8115423, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (providing for counsel for individuals with 
mental competency issues). Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce 
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or 
Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21 
/safeguards-unrepresented-immigration-detainees.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6NB-UXNM] (provid-
ing for counsel for individuals with mental competency issues). 
 226. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, MYTH VS. FACT: IMMIGRANT FAMILIES’ APPEARANCE RATES IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT (2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/MythvFact 
-Immigrant-Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3JE-Y3FG]; Eagly & Shafer, supra note 6, at 73 
(noting that over a six-year study period, only 7% of migrants in deportation proceedings with 
representation failed to appear for their hearings and received an in absentia order); Miriam 
Jordan, Most Migrants Make Their Court Date: Vast Majority Show Up to Deportation 
Hearings, U.S. Agency Says, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 7, 2014, 7:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com 
/articles/most-migrants-make-their-court-date-1412715818 [https://perma.cc/UP9D-8LNC]. 
 227. NYIRS REPORT, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that migrants “facing deportation in New 
York immigration courts with a lawyer are 500% as likely to win their cases as those without 
representation”); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that migrants represented by coun-
sel were five-and-a-half times more likely to obtain relief from deportation); Schoenholtz & 
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to their clients and remind their clients of upcoming court dates. Because not all 
individuals are represented, the presence of a licensed attorney in the case may be a 
very relevant predictor of likelihood of appearance at hearings that would have no 
parallel in the criminal justice context. 
There is a final important consideration that calls into question the applicability 
of criteria developed in the criminal pretrial detention context to the immigration 
custody determination process. Migrants involved in immigration court deportation 
proceedings are very diverse, and the diversity of the characteristics they present may 
very well affect predictability of risk.228 Each immigration case may involve very 
different deportation charges as well as potential outcomes based on a range of re-
quests for relief from deportation that are available. For example, as noted above, 
family ties may not be a relevant factor for assessing the flight risk presented by an 
asylum seeker. On the other hand, family ties may be predictive of the likelihood of 
appearance at future hearings for a lawful permanent resident facing deportation after 
a criminal conviction. Such an individual may have every incentive to appear in court 
to fight deportation in order to achieve the right to remain with family in the United 
States. Family ties might even affect eligibility for certain forms of relief, which may 
also help predict future appearances, while being irrelevant for other forms of re-
lief.229 This diversity of migrants in deportation proceedings makes it all the more 
necessary to evaluate the specific criteria or sets of criteria that will best predict flight 
risk and danger to the community for the full range of migrants impacted rather than 
relying on factors set in the criminal justice system.  
b. Misuse of the Borrowed Factors and Arbitrary Bonds 
Even if the criteria borrowed from the criminal justice system could predict risk 
accurately in the immigration pretrial detention context, the factors still would not 
lend themselves to the calculation of a bond amount. The identified factors “are not 
designed to assist in assigning an amount” of bond in the criminal pretrial context, 
because money bond is disfavored and has not been shown to be effective in address-
ing risk.230 Instead, the factors are used to determine the level of risk of flight or 
                                                                                                                 
 
Bernstein, supra note 195, at 5556; Representation Makes Fourteen-Fold Difference in 
Outcome: Immigration Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 15, 
2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396/ [https://perma.cc/T272-UQ79]. 
 228. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 8687 (pointing out the diversity problem 
with risk assessment in the immigration detention context). 
 229. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012) (providing for “cancellation of removal” for 
certain nonpermanent residents with close family ties in the United States and providing the 
opportunity for such individuals to obtain lawful permanent resident status).  
 230. CALIFORNIA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 180, at 12 (noting that there is no research 
to support a tie between bond and risk mitigation); see also ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE 
STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-5.3(a) (establishing that financial conditions are 
treated as a last resort); PEPIN, supra note 180, at 2 (advocating for the use of nonfinancial 
release conditions); SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that the “best research” available 
suggests that money bond “does not matter when it comes to either public safety or court 
appearance”); SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 32 (“[E]xpecting money to effectively mitigate 
risk . . . is historically unfounded.”). 
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danger presented and the possibility that measures other than detention could address 
any existing risks, in order to make an “in-or-out” decision regarding detention.231 In 
the criminal pretrial context, with its presumption of release, the risk assessment then 
dictates release unless the risk level is so high that it justifies exceptional resort to 
detention.232 If application of the pretrial factors reveals specific risk concerns in an 
individual case that do not justify detention, conditions of release, other than bond, 
can be set.233 Conditions are those that can be fulfilled after release (e.g., enrollment 
in support or monitoring programs).234 
DHS and the immigration courts nonetheless use the factors in setting bond 
amounts, given the focus on bond setting in the immigration custody determination 
process. The factors are not used to decide release or detention, since detention is the 
default, nor are they used to set conditions to be followed after release to mitigate 
risk, given the heavy emphasis on bond as the main condition on release available.  
The mismatch between the use of the pretrial criteria in the criminal pretrial jus-
tice and immigration contexts encourages arbitrariness in the immigration custody 
determination process. The factors adopted from the criminal justice context have 
nothing to say about particular levels of monetary bond that should be assessed. That 
is not their role or function. The criminal justice research not only fails to show a 
connection between imposition of monetary bond and pretrial compliance but also 
finds no confirmation that particular bond amounts are more effective at preventing 
certain risks of flight or danger than others.235 Because the pretrial factors provide 
no meaningful standards for bond setting, DHS and the immigration courts set bond 
                                                                                                                 
 
 231. SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 41–44 (clarifying that the pretrial custody decision 
should be “an in-or-out” decision to be immediately effectuated without the imposition of 
monetary bond, which may delay or prevent release); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2012) 
(listing possible conditions on release while providing that a “financial condition” may not be 
imposed if it “results in . . . pretrial detention”); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (listing factors to be 
considered in determining whether release is possible). 
 232. SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 90 (explaining that pretrial risk assessments are used to 
help judges “with maximizing . . . release” while detaining those who should be detained). 
 233. See SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 41–44 (clarifying that the imposition of monetary 
bond, aside from being of questionable effectiveness, delays or prevents release in frustration 
of the in-or-out decision). 
 234. See id. at 44 (clarifying that any flight risk or public safety concerns should “be ad-
dressed after release through conditions that are designed to reasonably mitigate that risk” 
(emphasis in original)). The criminal jurisdictions that have implemented pretrial risk assess-
ment tools are generally jurisdictions that no longer make heavy use of bond yet still achieve 
high appearance rates. See id. at 59–62. Because the risk factors are not designed to set bond 
but rather to identify other appropriate conditions of release, those jurisdictions that regularly 
impose bonds often do so based not on those factors but on arbitrary bond schedules, which 
set amounts based on the crime charged. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 22–23. 
 235. CALIFORNIA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 180, at 12; see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., 
supra note 31, at 22 (“[D]espite the use of money bail at increasingly higher amounts, failure 
to appear rates have not changed substantially.”); SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 13 (identifying 
difficulty in establishing how one bond amount would be more effective at addressing risk 
than another); VANNOSTRAND ET AL., supra note 212, at 2 (noting that research on establishing 
risk is well established but research is still new on determining what pretrial conditions offer 
the best match with particular risks). 
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amounts arbitrarily.236 The bond requirements then lead, all too often, to continued 
detention without connection to identified flight risk or danger to the community.  
Thus, while nominally using pretrial risk factors in the custody determination pro-
cess, DHS has offered no guidance to its officials establishing when those factors 
would dictate that monetary bond should be imposed as a condition of release rather 
than release or detention alone, nor has DHS indicated when the minimum $1500 
bond amount should be imposed or when other levels of bond would be proper.237 
The bond amounts imposed by DHS are necessarily lacking in rationality and con-
nection to specific risk considerations that suggest the potential for flight or danger.  
In the absence of any meaningful guide to decision making other than the pre-
sumption of detention, DHS also regularly sets across-the-board bond amounts for 
entire groups in its initial custody determinations.238 These determinations neces-
sarily lack any logical relation to identified risk, because they treat all migrants the 
same when differences must exist. DHS sets the same bond amounts for all individ-
uals in custody at a particular detention facility or in a particular region during a 
specific time period. For example, DHS issued instructions that bonds should be set 
at the same amount of $7500 for virtually all of the asylum-seeking women held at 
the T. Don Hutto Residential Center in Taylor, Texas, (“the Hutto facility”) for a 
period during 2013, and bonds were consistently set at the $7500 mark.239 Then, 
instructions were issued that bonds at the Hutto facility and other facilities in the 
same detention region should be set at $3000 because the available bed space was 
nearly filled, and bonds were set or reduced to $3000 before increasing again after a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. Cf. SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 13 (noting arbitrary nature of decision regarding 
particular bond amount). 
 237. The risk assessment tool deployed by DHS is very limited in its ability to make rec-
ommendations about release on bond. See RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, 
at 4 (stating only that, if the risk assessment tool “produces a recommendation to detain the 
alien, the recommendation will also indicate whether the alien is eligible for release on bond”). 
 238. See, e.g., ACLU Letter Regarding High Bonds, supra note 30, at 2; E-mail from 
[REDACTED], ICE/Enforcement and Removal Operations Assistant Field Office Director, 
to [REDACTED] (Apr. 17, 2014) (hereinafter Apr. 17, 2014 ICE e-mail) (e-mail obtained 
through FOIA response to National Immigrant Justice Center on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal) (sending instructions of the director for the San Antonio, Texas, detention region: 
“Effective tomorrow (4-18-2014) Bonds will go up from the previous $7,500.00 to 
$10,000.00.”); E-mail from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] (April 18, 2014, 3:44 PM) 
(e-mail obtained through FOIA response to National Immigrant Justice Center on file with the 
Indiana Law Journal) (advising of ICE headquarters “guidance” that “Credible Fear cases 
bond amount will increase to $7,500.00”).  
 239. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REDACTED FORMS I-286: NOTICE OF CUSTODY 
DETERMINATION [hereinafter HUTTO I-286 FORMS] (completed forms for women detained at 
the Hutto Facility on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (documenting $7500 bond amounts 
set in multiple cases for individuals from from different countries during the late July-early 
September 2013 period); E-mail from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] (July 22, 2013, 
7:20 AM) (e-mail obtained through FOIA response to Denise Gilman on file with the Indiana 
Law Journal) (establishing a policy that DHS would set $7500 bond for individuals detained 
at the Hutto facility who had passed a screening interview to establish a viable asylum claim 
and who could show identification; establishing a policy of denying release (“NO BOND”) 
where identification unavailable). 
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period.240 Bond setting for Central American mothers and children apprehended at 
the Southwest border provide another example. After an initial period when DHS 
insisted on continued detention without potential for release on bond,241 DHS began 
setting across-the-board bond amounts as a condition of release. For several months, 
DHS set bonds for almost all women detained with their children at the Karnes City, 
Texas, detention facility at either $7500 or $10,000.242 These categorical bonds are 
not related to individual flight risk or danger considerations and so must be seen as 
arbitrary.  
Immigration court review, through custody redetermination hearings, does not re-
solve the arbitrariness of the bonds set in initial DHS custody determinations either. 
The leading case law on custody redetermination proceedings from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals provides no guidance to the immigration courts as to how the 
specified custody determination factors are to be weighed or applied in determining 
bond amounts.243 The average bond amounts set by different immigration judges 
vary greatly without any apparent explanation for the disparities.244 Given the wide 
discretion offered to immigration judges in custody redetermination hearings and the 
lack of direct judicial review, there is little likelihood that arbitrary bonds set by DHS 
and the immigration courts will be corrected. 
The bond requirement imposed by DHS or the immigration courts is often not just 
arbitrary, but arbitrarily high.245 Many release-eligible migrants thus remain detained 
for extended periods or throughout their deportation proceedings because of inability 
to pay a bond that was imposed.246 Their detention is not justified, because DHS or 
the immigration courts have explicitly found that release is possible and detention is 
not the only viable means of preventing flight or danger in their cases, by allowing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Sept. 17, 2013 ICE e-mail, supra note 111 (describing a teleconference during which 
DHS officials stated that the San Antonio detention region, which encompasses the Hutto fa-
cility and other facilities, was close to “maximum bed space capacity” and setting a policy of 
imposing $3000 bond for asylum seekers in detention who had identification and had passed 
the screening interview to establish a viable claim); Apr. 17, 2014 ICE e-mail, supra note 238 
(sending instructions of the director for the San Antonio, Texas, detention region: “Effective 
tomorrow (4-18-2014) Bonds will go up from the previous $7,500.00 to $10,000.00.”); see 
also HUTTO I-286 FORMS, supra note 239 (documenting $3000 bond amounts set in multiple 
cases after September 17, 2013). 
 241. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 17071 (D.D.C. 2015); Declaration of 
Barbara Hines, R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164. 
 242. See ACLU Letter Regarding High Bonds, supra note 30. 
 243. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *3. 
 244. See, e.g., Ryo, supra note 13, at 133 (finding significant differences among bond 
amounts set by different immigration judges in custody redetermination hearings held in cen-
tral California for a specific category of migrants who had received their hearings as a result 
of a federal court order). 
 245. See NYIRS REPORT, supra note 7, at 13; ACLU Letter Regarding High Bonds, supra 
note 30; E-mail from [REDACTED], Supervisory Detention & Deportation Officer, South 
Texas Detention Complex, to Docket Officers, (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:17 PM) (e-mail obtained 
through FOIA response to National Immigrant Justice Center on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal) (supervisory DHS detention officer at a particular facility issuing guidance to all DHS 
officials indicating that bond “should be set at a minimum of $7500” (emphasis added)). 
 246. NYIRS REPORT, supra note 7, at 13–14.  
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for release upon payment of bond.247 By nonetheless insisting on the payment of an 
unattainable bond as a condition for release, rather than identifying other measures 
that would permit release and also address any specific identified risks, detention 
continues without adequate justification.  
3. The Overall Impact of Selective Borrowing from the Criminal Justice System on 
the Potential for Liberty  
In addition to detaining as a default, then, the immigration custody determination 
process also fails to ensure subsequent release where detention is not necessary to 
prevent specific risk of flight or danger. With money bond as their only real tool in 
the custody determination process, and lacking meaningful criteria for determining 
risk or standards for setting bond amounts, DHS and the immigration courts impose 
arbitrary bond requirements that impede, if not prevent, release. 
The problems inherent in selective borrowing from the criminal pretrial justice 
system are compounded by the lack of any legal support for the emphasis on mone-
tary bonds in the immigration pretrial detention context. The blindered focus on 
monetary bonds is nowhere mandated by law and has not received constitutional 
approval from the courts.248 Meanwhile, international bodies have expressed concern 
about the use of monetary bonds because of the likelihood that they will lead to un-
justified detention.249 The reliance on money bonds, which are set arbitrarily, has an 
unacceptable negative impact on liberty. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAILED CUSTODY DETERMINATION PROCESS  
In combination, automatic and nonindividualized detention and selective adop-
tion of problematic elements of the criminal pretrial justice model result in wide-
scale detention of release-eligible migrants during pending immigration court depor-
tation proceedings. The custody determination process for release-eligible migrants 
in immigration court deportation proceedings has floated so far adrift of its legal and 
theoretical moorings that the right to liberty is seriously compromised.250 Lacking 
                                                                                                                 
 
 247. Cf. SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 6162 (noting, in the criminal justice context, that 
individuals who an adjudicator has determined may be released, albeit on a condition, should 
not then be detained as a result of a monetary bond requirement). 
 248. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 951–52 (9th Cir. 
2008) (ordering bond hearing as the forum for migrants to “challenge the necessity of [their] 
detention” but saying nothing about the role of monetary bond); Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 
F.3d 865, 871–72 (5th Cir.) (holding that bond amount must be reasonable and “that a bond 
that has the effect of preventing an immigrant’s release because of inability to pay . . . is pre-
sumptively unreasonable”), vacated as moot, 375 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2004); Gordon v. 
Johnson, 300 F.R.D. 28, 30 (D. Mass. 2014) (ordering bond hearing to provide the opportunity 
to argue for release without mentioning monetary bond). 
 249. IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 2, at 82. 
 250. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (affirming the central role of 
liberty and the exceptionality of detention in the immigration context and explaining that dep-
rivation of liberty requires “special justification,” usually to address flight risk or danger to 
the community); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (emphasizing that detention, 
which is not based on criminal punishment after trial, is allowed only in narrow nonpunitive 
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conscientious adherence to the limits of civil administrative detention, the system 
veers impermissibly into the realm of arbitrary and punitive restriction on liberty in 
violation of constitutional and human rights standards.251 Rectification is required on 
this basis alone to restore limits on immigration detention and proper respect for 
liberty.  
The contorted interaction between the immigration and criminal justice pretrial 
detention systems, described above,252 also creates the potential for serious erosion 
of liberty standards for all. The differences between immigration and criminal sys-
tems are ignored when those differences might favor migrants and are magnified 
when they can explain lesser consideration of liberty concerns for migrants.  
Thus, it is assumed that pretrial detention structures are appropriate for migrants 
in pending immigration court deportation proceedings because of their use in the 
criminal pretrial context.253 Migrants are treated as similar to criminals simply be-
cause of their status as noncitizens in immigration court deportation proceedings.254 
Yet, migrants in detention pending immigration court deportation proceedings are 
not facing criminal charges; many are refugee protection seekers or others with no 
criminal history at all, while some have minor criminal histories but have already 
served any criminal sentence imposed. These migrants may well present fewer dan-
gers to the public and the adjudicatory process than criminal defendants.255  
On the other hand, immigration court deportation proceedings are treated as dis-
tinct from the criminal process for the purpose of incorporating protections and les-
sons learned from the criminal pretrial justice experience, such as prompt, independ-
ent, and careful scrutiny of detention decisions and the move away from monetary 
bond. The immigration system is distinguished as involving civil, rather than crimi-
nal, consequences.256 The unique status of migrants as noncitizens whose treatment 
may raise national sovereignty considerations, including control of borders and in-
ternational affairs, is also invoked.257 On this view, sharp distinctions are made be-
tween citizens and migrants and between the immigration system and criminal jus-
tice processes. However, these distinctions are suspect, since the consequences of 
                                                                                                                 
 
circumstances); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (affirming that “liberty is 
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception”).  
 251. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
 252. See supra Parts II.A–B.  
 253. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (justifying detention for 
immigration purposes on the grounds that “[d]etention is a usual feature of every case of arrest 
on a criminal charge”). 
 254. See Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 163–64, 172 (noting that “[d]etention 
brands immigrants as criminals . . . and contributes to the sense that they deserve to be treated 
as such”). 
 255. See SCHRIRO, supra note 58, at 2, 4, 21 (noting that immigration detainees present 
low risks, given their motivation to participate in their immigration court proceedings, and so 
should not be treated similarly to individuals in the criminal incarceration system).  
 256. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 257. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2003) (“Congress may make rules 
as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” and “detention during deporta-
tion proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”); Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (“Congress has the authority to detain aliens suspected of entering 
the country illegally pending their deportation hearings.” (citation omitted)). 
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deportation proceedings can be as severe as a criminal conviction. Also, noncitizens 
may have strong claims to recognition of status as members of the national commu-
nity, after having lived in the United States for many years and developing strong 
family and community ties or by presenting valid refugee claims countenanced in 
U.S. law. Further, migrants may be caught up in both immigration and criminal pro-
ceedings.258 In any case, both criminal and immigration pretrial detainees are held in 
nonpunitive administrative detention, which involves a single constitutional framework.  
This process of unprincipled comparing and contrasting of the immigration and 
criminal justice systems promotes the weakest possible understanding of liberty and 
the limits on administrative detention not imposed as punishment after a criminal 
trial. The weakening of liberty standards harms release-eligible migrants facing pre-
trial immigration detention but may also have even broader negative impacts for ad-
ministrative detention in general, including in the criminal justice pretrial detention 
context. The impetus to detain migrants easily leads to new levels of criminal pretrial 
detention where non-citizens are involved.259 At a systemic level, if left unchecked 
in the immigration context, patterns of unnecessary deprivation of liberty may extend 
beyond immigration detention to make it increasingly difficult to insist on limitations 
on administrative detention in the pretrial criminal detention context and elsewhere. 
Efforts in the criminal pretrial justice realm to improve adherence to the principles 
of exceptional pretrial detention, and thus address one aspect of mass incarceration, 
may be damaged.  
More immediate and concrete concerns exist, as well. The current flawed pretrial 
immigration detention system creates significant harm for detained migrants and 
their families as well as the larger community. These may be harms that would be 
acceptable if absolutely necessary to ensure the integrity of the immigration process 
but should be avoided where, as here, a showing of need is lacking on a systematic 
basis. 
The damage to detainees created by unnecessary restrictions on liberty is great. 
In addition to the inherent damage to human dignity caused by the deprivation of 
liberty, detention has negative impacts on the physical and emotional health of the 
migrant in detention.260 Many migrants in deportation proceedings have experienced 
                                                                                                                 
 
 258. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
 259. This relationship already has had its impact. An increase in pretrial detention in crimi-
nal cases at the federal level is directly attributable to the high rates of pretrial detention of 
migrants facing criminal charges. See THOMAS H. COHEN, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
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Service were charged with immigration offenses such as illegal entry). 
 260. Allen S. Keller, Barry Rosenfeld, Chau Trinh-Shevrin, Chris Meserve, Emily Sachs, 
Jonathan A Leviss, Elizabeth Singer, Hawthorne Smith, John Wilkinson, Glen Kim, Kathleen 
Allden & Douglas Ford, Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 LANCET 1721, 1722 
(2003) (explaining that “detaining asylum seekers exacerbates symptoms of depression, anxi-
ety, and post-traumatic stress disorder”); Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 163–64, 
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trauma, including torture and sexual abuse, or have mental health difficulties or other 
vulnerabilities.261 Detention, for relatively short time periods as well as for prolonged 
time periods, can cause even greater harm to such individuals.262 As noted above, it 
is also much more difficult for detained migrants to obtain counsel and to succeed 
on their claims, meaning that some individuals who might otherwise be found enti-
tled to remain in the United States will instead be deported.263 Detention damages 
the families left behind when relatives are deprived of liberty as well.264 
There is also significant harm to the community when the custody determination 
process does not ensure that those detained are those most likely to present a flight 
risk or danger. The public and the legal system benefit from detention that addresses 
situations in which migrants present serious risks of flight or danger that cannot be 
prevented except through restrictions on liberty. However, it is also in the 
community’s interest not to detain where unnecessary, particularly because detention 
of migrants is a very expensive endeavor.265 Where some reasonable concern about 
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(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00011-JEB). 
 263. See supra notes 194–96, 227 and accompanying text. 
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IMPACT OF DETENTION AND DEPORTATION ON U.S. MIGRANT CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A 
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 265. 2015 ICE BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 105, at 39 (page 1287 in full version of DHS Budget 
Request) (budget for detention operations was almost $2 billion during the last several fiscal years). 
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risk of danger or flight exists, it is desirable to determine whether there are means of 
mitigating that risk in ways that are less expensive than detention, both in financial 
and human costs. 
Yet, because of its presumptive application of detention and its reliance on arbi-
trary monetary bond requirements as the only option for obtaining release, the cur-
rent system does a poor job of sorting out those migrants who require detention from 
those who could be released altogether or with conditions imposed after release to 
address specific risk factors. Overdetention is the main result.266 However, there may 
also be underdetention in some cases. The automatic and arbitrary detention de-
scribed in this Article affects individuals who are apprehended by immigration au-
thorities, but a good number of migrants who might be subject to immigration court 
deportation proceedings are never detained at all and in some cases might actually 
present greater risks than those detained. It is also possible that the focus on monetary 
bonds allows wealthier migrants to achieve release from detention relatively 
promptly, albeit still after some period of detention. Some of these migrants may 
present risks not presented by migrants who remain detained.267 The cost to the com-
munity is significant under a system that fails to detain when, and only when, necessary. 
IV. A NORMATIVE RESPONSE AND A CALL FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
A normative response is required to address the failures of the immigration cus-
tody determination process that lead to such dire results. Reforms should be under-
taken to restore restraint in the immigration pretrial detention scheme for release-
eligible migrants and to impose logic and legality in the custody determination 
process. Such reform will require changes in the legal and practical framework for 
the custody determination system as well as additional research and inquiry.  
A. Reestablishing Presumptive Liberty and Individualized Review 
The constitutional right to liberty must regain its foothold in order to begin a 
meaningful reform process. The very nature of the immigration pretrial custody de-
termination process must change so that liberty is at the center. To meet the require-
ments of civil detention, the role of the system should be to ensure that detention is 
strictly limited and that release after initial apprehension and processing is achieved 
wherever possible. All actors involved with the custody determination process will 
need to recognize the current reality of a system that focuses on automatic detention 
and then on troubling monetary bond setting, rather than on liberty itself.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. See Kalhan, supra note 10, at 48.  
 267. See EOIR STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2015, supra note 5, at P2 (showing that some mi-
grants are never detained during immigration court deportation proceedings including some 
who fail to appear for their hearings); LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 188, at 1 
(noting that arbitrary and nonindividualized decisions regarding pretrial detention lead to re-
lease of “defendants who are high-risk and/or violent” along with unnecessary detention of 
defendants who present low risk); Wiseman, supra note 179, at 1361–62 (noting, in the crimi-
nal justice context, that affluent individuals may achieve release after paying bond even 
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achieve release). 
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To avoid further entrenchment of the current reality, the custody determination 
process should not be posited as a model of individualized decision making regarding 
detention. While the custody determination process offers a substantial benefit to 
those in mandatory detention who have been denied any opportunity for release, it is 
nonetheless deeply flawed.268 Describing the custody determination process as a 
remedy for liberty violations, rather than as a problem, makes it more difficult to 
critique and reform the system.269 The process should be dramatically changed be-
fore deployment in any setting in order to protect liberty.  
In addition, the very language used to describe and discuss the custody process 
should be modified to reflect and motivate the required paradigm shift. If the lan-
guage of the entire system accepts the central place of detention and monetary bond, 
then it will be near impossible to re-envision the role of the system as one dedicated 
to individualized release decisions. New and consistent terminology should be de-
veloped to better describe the critical decisions made in the process. For example, 
the commonly used terms “bond proceedings,” “bond eligible,” and “no bond” might 
be replaced with “custody determination process,” “release or review eligible,” and 
“detention determination.” 
In the process itself, reform requires that detention as the default give way to a 
presumption of release. It must be recognized that detention is not necessary as a 
general matter, because most migrants in deportation proceedings do not present a 
meaningful risk of flight or danger to the community that could justify detention. 
Such a shift will require a change in legal norms as well as a shift in the way the 
government conceives of detention for release-eligible migrants in pending immi-
gration court deportation proceedings.270 The result would undoubtedly be a signifi-
cant reduction in the numbers of release-eligible migrants who are detained. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 268. See, e.g., Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that 
additional protections are necessary after prolonged mandatory detention to make the custody 
determination process adequately protect liberty and ensure meaningful individualized deter-
minations of the necessity of continued detention), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). But cf. Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 12181220 
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in immigration court custody redetermination hearings after prolonged detention without re-
view suggest that the custody determination process is sufficient to remedy serious liberty 
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 270. See Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 163 (noting that “[d]etention is treated 
as a pillar of the US immigration enforcement system” when other means exist to meet immi-
gration objectives). The regulation that places the burden on the detained migrant to justify 
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that presumes release without requirement of bond. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)(8) (2016) 
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N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006), 2006 WL 3337627, at *3 (same). 
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In line with ensuring that detention is utilized only when necessary, genuine indi-
vidualized determinations of necessity must be made before detention is imposed at 
the initial custody determination stage. DHS should immediately release appre-
hended migrants on their own recognizance or conditional parole, after basic pro-
cessing, unless there are “red flags” in an individual case that suggest a risk of flight 
or danger that cannot be addressed by means other than detention. This is the only 
way to ensure that liberty is the rule and detention the exception, thereby respecting 
the principles of limited civil detention.271 In addition, where release is not immedi-
ately possible, DHS must conduct periodic reviews of the detention to ensure that it 
is still necessary. 
Restoring liberty as the general rule also requires careful scrutiny of any condi-
tions on release to ensure that they do not implicate unnecessary constraints on free-
dom.272 Money bond should be strongly disfavored, since a monetary bond require-
ment does not effectuate immediate release and does not effectively ameliorate risks 
of flight or danger to the community.273 DHS should use monetary bond as a condi-
tion of release only as the last resort.274 Financial requirements should be used only 
where bond can address an identified risk that would not be addressed through re-
lease alone or release on other conditions that do not require any additional detention. 
The use of bond will be a rare circumstance given the low likelihood that monetary 
bond diminishes risk where such risk exists.  
This rejection of the primary role of monetary bond will require acknowledgment 
that release on recognizance is proper and appropriate in most cases where release is 
possible because there is no identified risk great enough to require detention. Fur-
thermore, if monetary bond is required, it should be set at a nominal amount and 
should take into account the ability of the migrant to pay so that it does not result in 
unjustified detention rather than immediate release.275  
In moving away from the use of monetary bonds, DHS should turn to liberty and 
not to alternative methods for ensuring detention or restrictions on liberty upon 
                                                                                                                 
 
 271. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532–33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–92 (2001). 
 272. An “in-or-out” custody decision is the recommended approach for pretrial decisions 
in the criminal justice system. SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 42–43, 54; SCHNACKE, supra 
note 93, at 1112. 
 273. See SCHNACKE, supra note 14, at 1213; SCHNACKE, supra note 93, at 32. 
 274. See ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 130, at Standard 10-5.3 (identi-
fying bond as a last alternative for release).  
 275. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial 
condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”); ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE 
STANDARDS, supra note 130, at 10-5.3(a) (providing that bond should not result in detention). 
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for a particular migrant. See Karnow, supra note 176, at 23. The vast majority of migrants in 
immigration court deportation proceedings have sufficiently low incomes that the edge of af-
fordability would probably be the minimum bond amount. Litigation has recently been filed 
challenging the failure of the custody determination process to consider a migrant detainee’s 
ability to pay in setting bond. Complaint–Class Action ¶¶ 12, Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 5:16-
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lying problem of undue reliance on monetary bond. 
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release. Particular attention should be paid to the risk that electronic monitoring or 
other intrusive monitoring requirements might become a substitute for detention. 
While such monitoring may allow for immediate release from detention, it nonethe-
less functions as a restriction on liberty.276 In addition, as mentioned above, the ef-
fectiveness of such monitoring in addressing flight risk or danger is not estab-
lished.277 Imposition of intensive monitoring for individuals identified as low risk 
may even lead to worse pretrial compliance outcomes.278 Monitoring may not then 
be used automatically or as a default, even when it serves as a replacement for full 
physical custody. It must only be used where an individualized determination estab-
lishes it to be a necessary and effective tool for addressing the particular risks pre-
sented in a case that preclude release without conditions, which is likely to be an 
exceptional circumstance.  
To ensure that detention is limited to those situations where it is actually needed, 
the immigration courts should automatically and promptly review any cases in which 
DHS orders detention or imposes a bond requirement. The immigration court cus-
tody redetermination hearing should take up the central issue of the need to detain 
rather than limiting itself to consideration of monetary bond. The immigration courts 
should be clearly empowered to release immediately on recognizance or otherwise 
without payment of any monetary bond. They should enjoy adequate independence 
to carry out that role. The right to automatic review of detention before the immigra-
tion courts should extend to all individuals in pending deportation proceedings who 
are not subject to mandatory detention by statute on criminal grounds. The review 
should apply to those treated as “arriving aliens” and to those in withholding-only 
proceedings after a final deportation order as well as other release-eligible 
migrants.279  
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 279. See Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 166 (making similar recommendation 
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B. Determining Risk Factors and Designing Measures To Address Identified Risk 
The process for determining the risk presented by migrants must be made rational. 
Rigorous research must form the basis of the process for deciding, in a given case, 
whether outright release is possible, whether additional mechanisms must be de-
ployed to address specific identified risk factors, or whether the risk is so great and 
unmanageable that detention is required. An agenda for empirical research should be 
prepared to address two components: (1) which factors best predict flight and danger 
in the immigration setting, and (2) what conditions may effectively ameliorate the 
risks presented without resorting to detention. The research should consider these 
questions with due attention to the range of different migrants who might be found 
in deportation proceedings. As this research agenda moves forward, certain reforms 
to the custody determination process should be adopted based on a considered evalu-
ation of the existing limited information available regarding risk factors and mecha-
nisms for addressing them without detention. 
1. Risk Factors  
All of the pretrial factors currently used in the immigration custody determination 
process, most having been borrowed from the criminal pretrial justice system, must 
be evaluated to determine whether and to what extent they predict flight risk or dan-
ger in different groups of migrants. In addition, though, the research should also con-
sider factors not currently utilized, which might be relevant to determining risk in 
the immigration context.  
It is likely that some factors that currently play little or no official role in the 
custody determination process may predict risk more accurately than those now con-
sidered. As such, it would be wise to use these factors while further research is con-
ducted. There are potential benefits in their use based on existing knowledge and 
little downside, since the currently used factors have not been tested either. Strength 
of the claim for relief from deportation and representation are two such factors that 
are currently ignored but will almost certainly serve a predictive function.  
Neither DHS nor the immigration courts currently consider likelihood of success 
on the merits as a matter of course during the custody determination process.280 A 
few BIA cases suggest that the possibility for relief might be considered, but the 
leading case setting forth the relevant factors does not mention likelihood of suc-
cess.281 The Immigration Judge Benchbook guidance on custody redetermination 
hearings also omits consideration of the possibility that the migrant will win the right 
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to remain in the United States in determining custody.282 However, common sense 
suggests that migrants will appear at hearings and remain law abiding if this behavior 
will result in a grant of permission to remain in the United States. They are much 
less likely to comply with immigration court deportation proceedings, and perhaps 
with the law more generally, if they will almost certainly be deported at the end of 
their immigration case.283 This factor thus merits use even as additional research is 
conducted. 
To be sure, there are some complications in considering the possibility of relief 
from deportation in determining custody, which will require particular scrutiny dur-
ing a period of simultaneous implementation and further study. The decision makers 
on detention, particularly within DHS at the initial custody determination stage, are 
not in a good position to evaluate the merits of a claim to remain in the United States. 
They lack sufficient information about the claim and will not be able to unravel the 
extremely complicated legal issues that are often involved. It is likely that viable 
claims might not be identified at the initial custody determination stage, potentially 
leading to continued detention for migrants who will eventually win the right to re-
main in the United States. Also, the perception of the migrant regarding the possibil-
ity of a win may be more important in determining flight risk than objective likeli-
hood of success. It would be hard to measure this subjective belief, and it might 
change over time. For migrants represented by legal counsel, the problems might not 
be as severe, since an attorney could help provide information regarding the claim 
early in the proceedings and could help set reasonable expectations regarding out-
comes. This possibility leads to the next consideration. 
Currently, representation does not factor into the custody determination pro-
cess.284 However, the existing limited research suggests that represented migrants 
comply at higher levels with their obligations during pending deportation proceed-
ings.285 The involvement of an attorney is thus likely to be predictive of higher ap-
pearance rates and overall compliance with the proceedings. Ensuring representation 
would also make it more possible to evaluate the nature and extent of any other risk 
indicators, thereby improving the risk assessment process in a way that will likely 
allow for release of migrants who might have otherwise faced detention. Represen-
tation should be treated as an element that requires further research, with considera-
tion in the custody determination process in the meantime.  
As with the likelihood-of-success factor, there are problems in considering access 
to counsel. Legal services available to migrants in deportation proceedings are lim-
ited, and it is particularly difficult to obtain counsel while detained. So, consideration 
of this factor might result in determinations that wealthier or more connected indi-
viduals, who can access counsel, present lower risks when they actually do not. How-
ever, recognition of representation as a crucial factor in lowering risk may well lead 
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to solutions that improve access to counsel in order to address risk rather than using 
detention for that purpose. 
2. Release and Risk Management 
With identification of the factors that are most predictive of risk, better custody 
decisions can be made. The factors can be used to develop tools that establish risk 
levels and identify specific concerns. Migrants not presenting significant risks could 
be immediately released. Where the relevant factors suggest that release alone would 
involve meaningful risk, research can help establish the best mechanisms to address 
specific concerns. These mechanisms can be tailored to effectuate release and then 
minimize any identified risk factors, except in those rare circumstances where deten-
tion is the only possible means to address an identified risk. 
Research will help to determine what types of conditions or programs will be 
effective at achieving compliance after release given specific levels of risk and types 
of risk factors appearing in a case. However, several promising possibilities for ame-
liorating risk are not currently considered at all and should be incorporated into the 
custody determination process immediately while ongoing evaluation takes place.  
Measures that would connect unrepresented migrants to counsel are likely to be 
very effective at addressing risk of flight or danger. In cases involving unrepresented 
migrants with other identified risk factors, it may be possible to secure compliance 
with the proceedings by offering representation rather than by detaining. There is no 
doubt that it would be costly for the government to guarantee access to counsel for 
individuals in immigration court deportation proceedings who otherwise would not 
have representation.286 However, there are multiple ways to develop a system for 
ensuring access to counsel in appropriate cases, with varying costs, including: (1) a 
government-funded, appointed-counsel system, (2) government-funded fellowships 
and other incentives to expand the immigration bar able to take such cases combined 
with placement structures for ensuring that identified migrants could be matched 
with such counsel, (3) governmental financial support to nonprofit and community-
based organizations in conjunction with programs for matching migrants with ser-
vices in appropriate cases, or (4) government-funded referral services that would 
place migrants with pro bono programs and attorneys. There are models for some of 
these possibilities. For example, there are policies and procedures in place to facili-
tate, if not guarantee, representation of unaccompanied minors.287 In any case, the 
cost should be considered in light of the possibility of achieving compliance with 
immigration proceedings without detention. If the goal is genuinely to ensure 
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appearance at hearings and prevent danger to the community, it will almost certainly 
be more cost effective to do so through provision of counsel rather than detention in 
those cases where this trade-off can be made.  
Systems for providing hearing reminders and other crucial case-processing infor-
mation will also likely have a significant positive impact on appearance rates, mak-
ing it possible to release migrants who will present little-to-no flight risk if they re-
ceive this assistance. In the criminal pretrial justice context, numerous studies have 
shown that hearing reminders are highly effective at improving appearance rates.288 
In the immigration context, it is often difficult for migrants in deportation proceed-
ings to obtain basic information regarding hearing dates and case processing, and no 
effort is made to provide better information to encourage appearances without re-
sorting to detention.289 To the contrary, elaborate provisions exist to ensure that pro-
ceedings can go forward without the appearance of the migrant, through entry of an 
in absentia order, so long as minimal procedural formalities of notice are met.290 
These provisions may permit efficient processing of cases, but they do little to ensure 
that notice is actually received by migrants who may wish to appear for their hearings 
but lack adequate information. Again, there would be some cost in providing hearing 
reminders and other information, but this cost would be a minimal burden in com-
parison with the potential for achieving liberty for greater numbers of migrants while 
still ensuring low risk of flight.291  
Other programs might be developed and tested to address specific risk factors that 
may arise for migrants who might otherwise be likely to comply with their obliga-
tions during pending deportation proceedings. For example, community-based hous-
ing and case-support programs would almost certainly show themselves to be very 
effective in addressing risks presented by migrants who do not have family ties or a 
stable residence and employment in the United States. In the United States and other 
countries as well, such programs have been successfully used to address flight risk 
without resorting to detention.292  
                                                                                                                 
 
 288. VANNOSTRAND ET AL., supra note 212, at 15–20. 
 289. See, e.g., John Fritze, Immigration Court Speeds Review of Cases Involving Children, 
BALT. SUN (Aug. 20, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md 
-immigration-rocket-docket-20140820-story.html [https://perma.cc/SM7J-ZZBS].  
 290. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012); M-D-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 54546 (B.I.A. 
2002), 2002 WL 31862204, at *5–7; G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181, 186–88 (B.I.A. 2001), 
2001 WL 1515819, at *4–7. 
 291. The additional reminders would have the goal of securing appearance. Where un-
successful because of a failure to provide the reminder or because of a migrant’s decision not 
to attend despite having full information, the possibility for an in absentia order would still 
exist and could provide additional incentives for appearance. 
 292. See, e.g., ALICE EDWARDS, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, BACK TO 
BASICS: THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON AND ‘ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION’ 
OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, STATELESS PERSONS AND OTHER MIGRANTS 60–66 (2011) 
(providing models of community-based support systems shown to be effective in other coun-
tries); Unlocking Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 170 (describing pilot program for commu-
nity-based case management and integration services for released migrants developed by the 
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and Catholic Charities); Public Advocate on the Road: 
Texas Community Engagement, PUB. ADVOC. VOICE, Oct. 2012, at 3, https://www.ice.gov 
/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/public-advocate-voice-issue2_10-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J58-TJ3D] 
2016] TO LOOSE THE BONDS  225 
 
The research described above will allow for further refinement of risk analysis 
and for calibration of responses. The findings will need to be converted into concrete 
standards and tools to guide individual decision makers to ensure their impact on the 
process. There is great potential, though, for replacing arbitrary detention and bond 
setting with rational custody determinations that prioritize liberty.  
CONCLUSION 
Mass incarceration is in the headlines as a problem facing our nation.293 Immi-
gration detention should not be left behind in the discussion of what is to be done. 
A particularly close look should be taken at the incarceration of migrants in pend-
ing immigration court deportation proceedings who are not required by any law or 
logic to be detained. No problems will be solved by insisting on the continued 
detention of these migrants who may eventually obtain the right to remain in this  
country and who will be joining our communities. To the contrary, by restoring the 
place of liberty and limiting pretrial detention of such migrants, the United States 
can begin to chip away at the vast and costly problem presented by the imprison-
ment of large segments of the population. This change can be achieved through 
reform of the immigration custody determination process to ensure that it fulfills 
the promise of effectuating freedom, rather than detention, as the norm.  
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